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JUSTICE AND THE OUTSIDER: Jurisdiction
over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems
Bethany R. Berger t
ABSTRACT: Over the last quarter century, the Court has progressively
limited tribal jurisdiction over both non-Indians and Indians who are not
members of the tribe. This Article examines these decisions to show that
they owe less to established Indian law doctrine than to two assumptions:
first, that tribal courts will be unfair to outsiders, and second, that
jurisdiction over outsiders has little to do with tribal self-government. It
then tests these assumptions against an examination of all cases decided by
the Navajo Nation appellate courts over the last thirty-five years and the
history and contemporary situation of tribal legal systems.
This investigation reveals that with respect to the first assumption, the
Navajo appellate courts are remarkably balanced in hearing cases
involving outsiders. Non-Navajos win 47.4 percent and lose 52.6 percent of
the cases in which they appear before the courts. The decisions, moreover,
appear to be qualitatively balanced, even with respect to cases and issues
that might appear particularly vulnerable to bias. This latter finding is
supported by a more limited review of decisions by other tribal courts.
In contrast with the second assumption, cases involving nonmembers
appear to be crucial for tribal self-government. They comprise a
disproportionately large number of cases before the appellate courts, and
form an equally disproportionate role in maintaining judicial legitimacy
and fairness. This is particularly true given the origin of tribal courts as
tools both of non-Indian acculturation and control and tribal resistance,
and the current struggle of tribes to thrive under radically changed
circumstances without losing their cohesion as distinct communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last several years, I have gotten speeding tickets exclusively on
Indian reservations. In this time, I have worked on three reservations and
have driven across several more, and the long, almost empty stretches
typical of reservation highways seem to call out for creative interpretation
of speed limits. As one might expect, I more than once have seen flashing
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lights in my rearview mirror and waited by the side of the road as a tribal
police officer wrote me a ticket.
That these were tribal police officers might be surprising to students of
Indian law. In 1978, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,' the United
States Supreme Court declared that non-Indians like me were not subject to
the criminal jurisdiction of Indian tribes.2 Since that time, the Court has
progressively limited tribal criminal, civil, and regulatory jurisdiction over
those that are not enrolled members of the tribe, and specifically limited
civil jurisdiction on state highways running through reservations.'
This trend is one of the most important developments in Indian law. It is
the focus of sustained attention by scholars, tribes, attorneys, and
legislators.4 In 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional power
of Congress to reverse these decisions.' Although the decision concerned
only criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, it provides support for a
proposed legislative reversal of decisions limiting civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians and nonmember Indians.6 Congress, however, will need
evidence that such jurisdiction is necessary and fair to act on this
opportunity. At the same time, the Supreme Court and lower courts
continue to decide questions of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, often
against tribal interests.
As my driving experience shows, despite judicial restrictions, tribes
continue to exercise significant jurisdiction over outsiders in ways that
conform to and sometimes test the limits of the law.7 These exercises
1. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
2. Id. at 212. A word about terminology may be helpful. This Article alternates between
the nouns Indian, Native American, and American Indian, and the adjective native, but
generally uses the term "Indian" to describe the descendants of the people here before
European-American settlement because it is the term most commonly used by Indian people
themselves, and is also the primary term used in the case law and scholarship regarding their
special legal status. The term "nonmember Indians" refers to Indians whose primary political
affiliation is with a tribe other than the tribe seeking jurisdiction over them. A member of the
Navajo Nation, for example, would be a nonmember Indian with respect to the Oglala Lakota
Nation.
3. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
4. See generally Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the Powers and
Authorities of the Indian Tribal Governments: Hearing on Concerns of Recent Decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Future of Indian Tribal Governments in America Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, S. Hrg 107-338, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (statements
of senators, tribal officials, and professors regarding legislation to reverse trend).
5. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199-206 (2004).
6. Hearing, supra note 4.
7. In the traffic example, the source of power over me was two fold. First, on many
reservations, tribal and state police are cross-deputized, giving them the power to stop and issue
summonses in the name of the other sovereign. Second, the tribes had found a way to enforce
their laws in the shadow of judicial denials of jurisdiction. The officers informed me that I had a
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sometimes result in judicial decisions, providing an opportunity to examine
what jurisdiction means for both nonmembers and tribal communities. But
there has been little empirical work regarding contemporary tribal legal
systems,8 and even less on cases involving nonmembers. 9 This Article
begins to fill this gap. It first examines the Court's decisions to reveal the
non-doctrinal suppositions about tribal legal systems that undergird them. It
then tests those assumptions empirically and theoretically.
The first part of the Article shows the ways that the Supreme Court's
nonmember decisions are shaped by two beliefs about justice and about
those considered outsiders to Indian tribes. The first belief is that
jurisdiction over nonmembers should be limited because tribes will treat
outsiders unfairly. According to this assumption, tribal courts are unfamiliar
places which disadvantage outsiders and are characterized by unwritten
customs, traditions, and bias toward nonmembers. Subjecting outsiders to
their jurisdiction, therefore, would contravene the "great solicitude" of the
United States "that its citizens be protected ... from unwarranted intrusions
on their personal liberty."1°
The second assumption is that jurisdiction over nonmembers and legal
issues shaped by outside influence, such as those involving commerce with
nonmembers, have little to do with tribal self-government. Since Oliphant,
the Court has repeatedly affirmed the tribal right to self-government. Self-
government, however, has been defined according to a stereotypical idea of
what tribes are and what they need to survive. Because of this, jurisdiction
has been limited to control over tribal members and the power to reproduce
practices, such as hunting and traditional ceremonies, understood as
choice: I could either accept tribal jurisdiction and pay my fine, or fail to pay and have the
matter turned over to the state police, which would result in points going on my state drivers'
license. It was not only my respect for tribal sovereignty that made me choose the former.
8. The legal studies include Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the
Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109 (2004); Mark D. Rosen,
Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and
the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479 (2000); Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court
Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285
(1998); and the much older SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS
OF SEPARATE JUSTICE (1978). Interesting recent anthropological works include BRUCE G.
MILLER, THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE (2000); Justin Richland, "What Are You Going to Do with
the Village's Knowledge?": Talking Tradition, Talking Law in Hopi Court, 39 L. & SOC. REV.
235 (2005); Larry Nesper, The Sovereign Tribal State's Reach into Seasonal Family Praxis:
Hunting and Fishing Trials in an Anishinaabe Community (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
9. There is increasing recognition in the scholarly community of this gap. Krakoff, supra
note 8, discusses the paradox of sovereignty these federal cases create for tribes.
10. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978); Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676, 692 (1990); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
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traditionally "Indian." The power to regulate new disputes and issues or to
engage in the commonplace stuff of government, on the other hand, is
deemed largely irrelevant.
The remainder of the Article tries to obtain the "view from the
reservation" on these assumptions. "It first tests the assumptions against the
experience of nonmembers in the Navajo Nation appellate courts. With
regard to the first assumption, the Navajo Nation court system on its face
might appear to be extremely vulnerable to the kinds of intrusions on
personal liberty the justices fear. The Navajo Nation has no constitution, all
of its judges are Navajo, and only one in six judges has a law degree. The
court also aggressively seeks to incorporate Navajo customary or traditional
law in its procedures and decisions. Despite these characteristics, the court
is both numerically balanced in its decisions regarding nonmembers-
47.4% of nonmembers win when they appear before the court, and 52.6%
lose-and qualitatively balanced, even in areas, such as child custody,
employment, and contract disputes, that might seem particularly prone to
bias. A less comprehensive review of decisions from other tribal court
systems reveals a similar effort to decide issues fairly, even where it
requires ruling against tribal members or the tribe itself.
With regard to the second assumption, the Article examines the role that
"outsiders" play in tribal legal systems. This role is shaped in part by the
unique history of modem tribal courts, which typically came to reservations
as tools of acculturation and control, rather than as means to address the
needs of tribal people. In light of this historical legacy, tribes have an uphill
battle both in tailoring their legal systems to the needs of tribal communities
and also in overcoming the perception that they are alien and hostile to
tribal traditions. Restricting tribal jurisdiction to tribal members perpetuates
the perception of these courts as inferior bodies designed only for control of
Indians.
Jurisdiction over nonmembers is also crucial for reasons common to all
legal systems. Here, I build on the insight of law and society scholars that
formal legal institutions play one of their most important roles not in
resolving disputes to which community norms already provide a solution,
but in addressing new conflicts that challenge community norms, and doing
so in a way that commands the acceptance of the community. This is
particularly true for tribes, which must find ways to deal with foreign
cultural and economic pressures without losing their coherence as
communities. Disputes involving outsiders and issues arising from the new
11. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 2-3 (1995) (arguing for an "inside-
out" approach to federal Indian law considering the perspective from the reservation context).
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kinds of commercial and domestic relationships they bring with them,
therefore, are exactly the kinds of questions that it is most important for
tribal legal institutions to resolve.
Both historical and modem accounts of tribal courts confirm the
disproportionate significance of cases involving relative outsiders to the
community. The case load of the Navajo appellate courts replicate these
accounts: despite the tiny fraction of nonmembers within the Navajo
Nation, 23% of the decisions issued by the Navajo appellate courts over the
last thirty-five years have involved nonmember litigants, as have 33% of the
decisions issued in the last ten years. Without jurisdiction over such cases,
the courts would not only be denied jurisdiction over some of the disputes
most pressing to Navajo people, but would be forced to forgo their
community-building role in forging distinctly tribal solutions to modem
problems.
Finally, jurisdiction over nonmembers is necessary to protect the
institutional incentives for tribal judges to do their jobs well. In line with
work on the importance of role perception in judicial performance, I argue
that the good track record of the Navajo courts is a function of its sense of
importance as the institution that must resolve the full range of conflicts
affecting Navajo people in a way that expresses the ideals of Navajo
culture. This institutional pride leads the judges to carefully scrutinize the
facts, law, and morality of the issues before them to fulfill this institutional
role and resist temptations to rule based on the status of the parties or
political pressure. Denying the courts jurisdiction over outsiders and the
issues they raise would radically diminish both the judges' sense of self-
importance and the impetus to take an objective view of Navajo practices.
Despite the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, tribal legal
systems have and will continue to have broad and often exclusive
jurisdiction over many disputes arising on reservations. Preserving and
enhancing these judicial incentives to fairness, therefore, is a matter of
importance to both members and nonmembers of Indian tribes.
Part II of the Article discusses United States Supreme Court opinions
regarding tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, showing the assumptions
about tribes and justice that undergird the decisions. Part Ill presents my
findings regarding decisions involving nonmembers in the Navajo appellate
courts, showing the balanced disposition of these cases, even in factual
situations one would assume would be particularly prone to bias. Part IV
discusses the role of "outsiders" in the development of tribal legal systems
and legal systems generally. In conclusion, Part V argues for a
reconceptualization of what tribes are, what those considered outsiders
1052 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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mean for them, and their importance as the Supreme Court and Congress
consider jurisdiction over nonmembers in tribal legal systems.
1I. JUDICIAL DIVESTITURE IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Since 1978, the Supreme Court has decimated tribal jurisdiction over
those that are not members of their tribes. Scholars have devoted much
attention to this trend. 2 While they have reached varying conclusions about
the roots of the cases, they almost uniformly agree that the decisions are not
accurate reflections of established Indian law doctrine.
13
Scholars have identified many potential justifications for these opinions.
One might simply dismiss this trend as racism or hostility to tribes. More
subtly, one can find convincing links between this trend and the colonial
12. What follows is a partial listing. Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The
Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003) highlights the
conflict between the Court's jurisprudence in the Indian Law arena with its trends in other areas
of decreasing federal power in favor of state sovereignty, and of providing heightened
protection for property rights. Similarly, in a 2001 article, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a
Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (2001), Sarah
Krakoff points to the relationship between the Indian Law cases and the Court's espousal of a
minimalist judicial philosophy. An earlier article, Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our
Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109
YALE L.J. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Frickey, A Common Law], provides an excellent exegesis of
many of these cases and points to the link between these cases and the historical colonial project
of the United States with respect to Indian tribes. David Getches, in reviewing all of the
Rehnquist Court's Indian law cases, not just the ones concerning jurisdiction over nonmembers,
explains these cases as part of the general tendency of the Court to favor state's rights, disfavor
"special rights" of minorities and other isolated groups, and protect majoritarian values and
expectations. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 268-69 (2001)
[hereinafter Getches, Beyond Indian Law]. L. Scott Gould posits that these cases are evidence of
a "consent paradigm," L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the
Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 814 (1996), while Frickey, in another article, argues that
although this paradigm may be descriptive of the Court's rhetoric, it does not explain the
normative underpinnings of the results. Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents:
Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1768-77 (1997).
T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY (2002) contains elements all of
these approaches, drawing links between the Court's Indian law cases and its other cases in
which the United States defined itself as a colonial power, as well as current jurisprudence of
the Court drawing lines between those considered legal citizens and those who are members of a
community without possessing formal citizenship in the community.
13. See, e.g., Frickey, A Common Law, supra note 12, at 8 ("What I identify is more an
unreflective judicial trend rooted in apparent uneasiness with tribal authority than a
paradigmatic, entrenched doctrinal shift."); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural
Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573
(1996) (arguing that recent Indian law decisions are results of subjective biases of justices rather
than legal analysis).
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project of the United States with respect to Indian nations.14 One can also
find congruence between the Court's Indian law jurisprudence and its
rulings in other areas of the law. 5
But such accounts do not fully explain why, within the same period, the
Court has been relatively consistent in protecting tribes and their members
from state and federal jurisdiction. Nor do they explain why the four more
liberal members of the Court-Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and
Stevens-have often joined and sometimes led the charge to limit tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers. These conflicting trends are best explained
by justices' assumptions regarding what jurisdiction over outsiders means
both for outsiders and for tribes. More specifically, the decisions are rooted
in the sense that tribal courts will not be fair to nonmembers, and that
jurisdiction over nonmembers, except where such jurisdiction is necessary
to protect practices perceived as traditionally Indian, has little to do with the
legitimacy of legal systems or tribal self-government. This section traces the
emergence and development of these themes.
A. The Beginning: Tribal Resurgence and Judicial Resistance
Tribal sovereignty saw a renaissance in the latter half of the twentieth
century.' 6 Mobilized by efforts to terminate their existence in the 1950s,
inspired by successful group action by African Americans, and aided by
federal policy initiatives regarding poverty and group rights, tribes
increasingly found ways to assert and exercise governmental power. After
initial resistance, Congress and the Executive largely supported these
efforts. 7 Together, these tribal and federal actions have created a revolution
in Indian country.'8
This revolution has included both economic and institutional
development,' 9 each of which has had the effect of subjecting more
nonmembers to potential tribal jurisdiction. Tribes increasingly took over
management of natural resources and businesses on reservations, resulting
in their employing, contracting with, and leasing lands to nonmembers. At
14. See generally Frickey, A Common Law, supra note 12; Singer, supra note 12.
15. David Getches, for example, has pointed to the extent to which the trend of ruling
against Indian tribes corresponds with the Court's other tendencies of ruling to further state
interests, protect majoritarian values, and undermine special minority rights. Getches, Beyond
Indian Law, supra note 12, at 267.
16. See generally STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE (1988).
17. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 80-86 (1987).
18. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Parallel Nations: New Prosperity Brings New Conflict to
Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8 & 9, 1998, § 1, at 1.
19. Id.
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the same time, tribes sought to develop tribal governmental capacity,
increasing the sophistication of their courts and exercising broader
regulatory control over their territories.
By 1978, about a third of tribal courts formally exercised jurisdiction
over non-Indians and non-tribal members on their reservations.20 At that
time, there was relatively broad recourse to federal court to challenge tribal
actions. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("ICRA") made most of the
federal Bill of Rights applicable to tribes,21 and until 1978 lower courts
typically interpreted it as creating a federal cause of action to challenge
tribal actions that violated individual rights.22 But relatively few individuals
subject to tribal jurisdiction challenged tribal actions, suggesting relative
satisfaction with its exercise.23
Despite this experience on the ground, many non-Indians were fearful
and resentful of tribal authority. While some state and local governments
welcomed tribal assistance in the expensive task of policing vast reservation
areas, others joined the protests of non-Indians, both to support their
citizens and because of the perceived threat posed by tribal assertions of
governmental power within their borders.
In 1978, the question of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians was placed
directly before the Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 4 The case
concerned the efforts by the Suquamish Tribe of Washington to prosecute
two non-Indian residents of the reservation: Mark Oliphant, who had
attacked tribal police when they tried to break up a drunken brawl between
Oliphant and some non-Indians attending the tribe's Chief Seattle Days
celebration, 2 and Daniel Belgarde, who had lead the tribal police in a two-
hour chase across the reservation rather than be pulled over for reckless
driving.26
20. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 (1978).
21. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1302 (2000).
22. See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 933 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975)
(collecting cases). In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1978), the Supreme
Court held that the only federal actions permitted to challenge tribal actions under the Indian
Civil Rights Act were habeas actions. Today, therefore, one may only challenge federal actions
under ICRA in cases challenging tribal custody or detention or threats of custody or detention.
23. Brief for Ass'n on Am. Indian Affairs, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae supporting
Respondents, at 39, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (No. 76-5729).
24. 435 U.S. at 191.
25. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (No. 76-5729). Before the celebration, in anticipation of the many
people that would attend, the tribe had requested assistance in policing the event from the
county and the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs, but received assistance of only one county
deputy for an eight hour period over the weekend. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 7.
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In its decision the Court created something wholly new in Indian law, the
principle that simply by incorporation within the United States tribes had
lost inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. According to the Court,
by "submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian
tribes ...necessarily give up their power to try" and punish non-Indian
citizens without authorization of this power by the United States.27 The
Court arrived at this principle through a process that Russel Barsh and
James Henderson have aptly compared to Lewis Caroll's description of the
Hunting of the Snark: "they charmed it with smiles and soap."2 8 By
patching together bits and pieces of history and isolated quotes from
nineteenth century cases, and relegating contrary evidence to footnotes or
ignoring it altogether,29 the majority created a legal basis for denying
jurisdiction out of whole cloth. This conclusion was not required by legal
precedent. 30 Rather, it was dictated by the Court's assumptions that tribal
courts could not fairly exercise jurisdiction over outsiders and that the effort
to exercise such jurisdiction was a modem upstart of little importance to
tribal concerns.
The Court portrayed control over a formal court system, and particularly
jurisdiction over nonmembers, as modem and inauthentic. First, courts
27. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
28. Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609, 609 (1979).
29. For example, the Court relied on a single treaty in which the Choctaw Tribe requested
the right to punish white men within their limits as evidence of a commonly held assumption
that no such jurisdiction existed absent delegation, leaving for the footnotes the many other
treaties that acknowledged the right of tribes to punish non-Indians. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197-
98. More egregiously, the Court cited an 1834 House of Representatives Report on limitations
on tribal power to try federal agents and travelers in Indian country as support for its holding,
conveniently eliding the fact that the Report affirmed broad tribal jurisdiction over all other
non-Indians in their territory. H.R. Rep. No. 23-474, at 18 (1834), reprinted in 263 U.S. Serial
Set, quoted in Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 202.
30. There were only two places in which federal case law suggested a limitation on tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. First, in dicta from a largely dissenting opinion in Fletcher v.
Peck, Justice Johnson wrote that "the restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount..
.to an exclusion of all competitors [to the United States] from their markets; and the limitation
upon their sovereignty amounts to the right of governing every person within their limits except
themselves." 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring), quoted in Oliphant,
435 U.S. at 209. Second, Isaac Parker, the judge for the Federal District of the Western
Territory of Arkansas had held that such jurisdiction was removed from the tribes by federal
statute, Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720), a conclusion
the Oliphant court rejected. Indeed, Felix Cohen, the Blackstone of Federal Indian Law, wrote
that originally a tribe "might punish aliens within its jurisdiction according to its own laws and
customs," and that "[s]uch jurisdiction continues to this day, save as it has been expressly
limited by the acts of a superior government." FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 146 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1945) (1941) [hereinafter 1941 COHEN].
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themselves were un-Indian: traditionally "[o]ffenses by one Indian against
another were usually handled by social and religious pressure and not by
formal judicial processes; emphasis was on restitution rather than on
punishment."'" Even within this un-Indian system, "[t]he effort by Indian
tribal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-indians . .. is a
relatively new phenomenon."32 Both formal court systems and the attempt
to exercise jurisdiction over outsiders, in other words, were creatures of the
late twentieth century, with little to do with the traditional concerns of
tribes.
The doubt that tribal governments could exercise jurisdiction fairly
figures even more prominently in the opinion. The Court held that tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians must be denied because of the "great
solicitude" of the United States "that its citizens be protected . .. from
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."33 The Court suggested that
tribal jurisdiction would cause such an intrusion on liberty specifically
because of the cultural and racial divide between those exercising
jurisdiction and those upon whom it was exercised.34 The Court quoted an
1883 decision regarding federal criminal jurisdiction over members of the
Sioux tribe to suggest that subjecting the defendant to tribal jurisdiction
would extend "over aliens and strangers; over the members of a community
separated by race [and] tradition . . . the restraints of an external and
unknown code ... which judges them by a standard made by others and not
for them."35 The 1883 Supreme Court did not hold that this cultural divide
was an absolute bar to federal criminal jurisdiction over tribal members,36
only that it was an additional reason not to construe a vague treaty provision
to repeal a statute clearly prohibiting such jurisdiction.37 The 1978 Court, in
contrast, held that these considerations spoke "equally strongly against the.
• . contention that Indian tribes . .. retain the power to try non-Indians
according to their own customs and procedure. 38 What was simply a rule of
31. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197.
32. Id. at 196-97.
33. Id. at 210.
34. See also Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Alegbra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial
of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WiS. L. REV.
219,270-71.
35. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (substitution in original) (quoting Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109
U.S. 556, 571 (1883)).
36. Indeed, three years later the Court upheld a federal statute authorizing such
jurisdiction. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886).
37. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571 (circumstances of case reinforce general rule against
repeal by implication).
38. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211.
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statutory construction was used to deprive tribes of jurisdiction over non-
Indians in the absence of any statute or provision of law.
B. The Flip Side: Reaffirming Tribal Control over Tribal Members
These concerns were sufficient to remove all tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. But that same term the Court issued two other opinions
insulating tribal actions concerning tribal members from federal control. In
United States v. Wheeler, a companion case to Oliphant, the Court held that
the Navajo Nation's power to criminally prosecute a member of the tribe
was "part of the Navajos' primeval sovereignty.., attributable in no way to
any delegation to them of federal authority" and therefore did not trigger the
Fifth Amendment prohibition on double jeopardy.39 A few months later, in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Court held that federal courts lacked
jurisdiction over a tribal member's challenge to a tribal ordinance that
excluded her children from tribal membership but would grant membership
to the children of a similarly situated male member.4" With hindsight, one
sees two separate tracks regarding tribal jurisdiction emerging in these
opinions. Where such jurisdiction touched non-Indians, it threatened
personal liberty and was not essential to tribal self-government, but when it
touched tribal members, only explicit federal action was sufficient to
overcome the invasion of tribal sovereignty.
This dichotomy emerged in cases regarding state jurisdiction in Indian
country as well. In these cases, the Court has developed a per se rule against
state taxing jurisdiction over tribes or their members in Indian country
absent unmistakably clear congressional authorization. 41 But where the
question involves activities of nonmembers, the trend has been towards
permitting jurisdiction unless the activity conforms to a sense of what is
traditionally Indian. Thus, state sales tax on cigarettes to non-Indians has
been allowed even where the taxation seems to significantly burden tribal
self government,42 as have severance taxes on oil and gas extracted from
tribal land,43 and even state regulation of on-reservation liquor sales to tribal
members.' Cases involving activities that might seem more stereotypically
39. 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978).
40. 436 U.S. 49, 55-70 (1978).
41. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,458 (1995).
42. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980).
43. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
44. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983). The Court in that case specifically declared that
it accorded "little if any weight to any asserted interest in tribal sovereignty" because of the lack
of a tribal history of regulating such sales. Id. at 725.
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Indian, however, such as hunting and fishing45 and timber management,46
have done notably better in this calculus.47
C. The Middle Period: Conflicting Visions of Tribal Institutions
While Oliphant had stripped tribes of all criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians, it was unclear what the case would mean in the civil or regulatory
context, or for Indians that were not enrolled members of the governing
tribe. Between 1980 and 1990, the Court repeatedly considered these
questions, sometimes affirming tribal jurisdiction and sometimes denying it.
These cases reflect a contest between two visions of tribes and their
institutions: the first, as sovereign entities needing jurisdiction to build and
develop, and the second as traditional groups for whom exercise of
jurisdiction over nonmembers or modem businesses would be both
anomalous and unfair.
In 1980, with little discussion, the Court in Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation48 upheld tribal taxes on non-
Indians purchasing cigarettes on tribal land.49 But in 1981 the Court held
that the Crow Tribe lacked jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing by
non-Indians on non-Indian owned land (so-called "fee land") on
reservations in Montana v. United States.5 0 The Court acknowledged that
tribes retained authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers who
entered into consensual relationships with tribes or whose activity
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."'" But the opinion seemed to
define the legitimate interests of the tribe as the creature of a remembered
past. The Court began its description of the facts of the case by stating that
"[t]he Crow Indians originated in Canada," subtly undermining the historic
45. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
46. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
47. In the middle period of the 1980s, there were some exceptions to this pattern, in
particular California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), which held that
tribal gaming businesses were immune from state regulation. See also Cent. Mach. Co. v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (holding that gross receipts tax on sale of
tractors to Indian tribe was exempt from state taxation).
48. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
49. Id. at 153. While parts of the Confederated Tribes opinion could be read to suggest
that it applied only to tribal trust land, others indicate that it applies to all doing business on the
reservation generally.
50. 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
51. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (citations omitted).
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authenticity of the tribe's claim to sovereignty over reservation land.52
Similarly, the lack of a tradition of regulating non-Indian hunting and
fishing was used to undermine the tribe's modem attempt to do so. The
Court stated that "the Crows were a nomadic tribe dependent chiefly on
buffalo, and fishing was not important to their diet or way of life. 53 More
importantly, the fact that the State of Montana had traditionally exercised
"near exclusive" jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on fee lands on the
reservation, and that, until recently, the tribe had "accommodated itself' to
this state regulation, was core to the Court's holding that tribal regulation
did not impact the self-government of the tribe.54 The fact that the tribe now
sought jurisdiction over natural resources on the reservation as a means to
revitalize its government and the reservation economy was irrelevant; all
that was important was that it had not done so in the past.
The Supreme Court's cases over the next few years did not follow this
lead, and instead protected tribal sovereignty as an evolving thing. In
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,56 for example, the Court affirmed tribal
authority to tax non-Indians on the oil and gas severed from lands leased
from the Tribe, stating that such authority "derives from the tribe's general
authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction,
and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by requiring
contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities
within that jurisdiction."57 It was left to the dissent written by Justice
Stevens to sound the alarm about non-Indians subject to the vagaries of
tribal jurisdiction.58
The first nonmember jurisdiction opinion of the Rehnquist Court,
however, signaled the ascendance of the Oliphant vision of tribal
governments. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
52. Id. at 547.
53. Id. at 556.
54. Id. at 564 n.13, 566-67.
55. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) ("Tribal authority over the
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil
jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively
limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.") (citations omitted); Kerr-McGee Corp.
v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1985) (upholding tribal taxes on
nonmembers despite lack of federal authorization of such taxes); Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos.
v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985) (requiring non-Indians challenging
tribal court jurisdiction to first make such challenges to tribal courts); Merrion v. Jicarrilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New
Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 846-47 (1982) (finding state taxes on non-Indian contractor preempted
in part by federal policy of encouraging self-determination).
56. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
57. Id. at 137.
58. Id. at 170-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Indian Nation59 considered whether the Yakima Nation could impose its
zoning requirements on reservation fee lands owned by two nonmembers,
Stanley Wilkinson and Philip Brendale. Wilkinson's parcel was in the
"open area" at the edges of the reservation, where there was significant
commercial and residential development and non-Indian ownership.60 In
contrast, Brendale's parcel was in the "closed area" toward the center of the
reservation,6 which was largely uninhabited, and had maintained a
"pristine, wilderness-like character., 62
The case fractured the Court. The justices issued three opinions, none of
which commanded a majority. Different majorities of five justices upheld
tribal jurisdiction as to Brendale's land,63 and rejected it as to Wilkinson's.'
Although none of the opinions gained a majority as to their reasoning, the
opinions signal the contested visions of sovereignty that figure in later
cases.
Justice White, joined by Justices Kennedy and Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, would not have upheld zoning jurisdiction over either parcel of
land. 6' The plurality would have held that the tribe lacked any general
zoning authority over fee lands within the reservation at all but simply had
the right to intervene in county zoning proceedings to argue that proposed
developments imperiled tribal interests.66 This had occurred in the
Wilkinson case, and the Court affirmed with little discussion the lower court
decision that the development posed no direct threat to the tribe.67
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment
on the Wilkinson parcel, and announced the opinion of the Court upholding
tribal jurisdiction over the Brendale parcel.68 The opinion centered on
concern for the nonmembers subject to tribal jurisdiction, a concern that
was only outweighed by the need for tribes to maintain their "traditional
59. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
60. Id. at 418; Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735, 752 (1985).
61. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 417
62. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. at 752.
63. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 433 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J., announcing the
judgment of the Court in No. 87-1622 and concurring in the judgment in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-
1711); id. at 448 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J., and Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgement in No. 87-1622 and dissenting in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711).
64. Id. at 409 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J., announcing
the judgement of the Court in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711); id. at 433 (Stevens, J., joined by
O'Connor, J., announcing the judgment of the Court in No. 87-1622 and concurring in the
judgment in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711).
65. Id. at 432.
66. Id. at 431.
67. Id. at 432-33.
68. Id. at 447-48.
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character." 69 This balance would support comprehensive tribal zoning
jurisdiction over the closed area, which "remains an undeveloped refuge of
cultural and religious significance, a place where tribal members 'may
camp, hunt, fish, and gather roots and berries in the tradition of their
culture.""'7 With respect to the open area where most tribal members
actually lived, however, time had "produced an integrated community that
is not economically or culturally delimited by reservation boundaries" and
was no longer "a unique tribal asset."'" Because the area did not fit non-
Indian images of the uniquely tribal, but instead looked much like any
modem community, the tribe had no legitimate interest in regulating it.
Only Justice Blackmun's opinion, which Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined, acknowledged the needs of tribes as modem governments struggling
with changing circumstances. The opinion recognized the need for "long-
term, active management of land use" that the White plurality would deny.72
Justice Stevens' opinion, moreover, "betray[ed] a stereotyped and almost
patronizing view of Indians and reservation life., 73 Blackmun went on, "In
my view . . . it must not be the case that tribes can retain the 'essential
character' of their reservations (necessary to the exercise of zoning
authority) only if they forgo economic development and maintain those
reservations according to a single, perhaps quaint, view of what is
characteristically 'Indian' today.,
74
In Duro v. Reina75 the next year, a clear majority of the Court held that
tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over Indians that were not members of
the tribe.76 Concern for fairness to nonmembers and a hackneyed vision of
tribal communities lie at the heart of the opinion. First, while the Court held
that tribes retained the jurisdiction over nonmembers necessary to "the
maintenance of tribal integrity and self-determination, ' 77 self-determination
was limited to the need "to preserve their own unique customs and social
order. ' 78 The modem realities of tribal communities, in which nonmember
Indians like Albert Duro, who lived with his tribal member girlfriend and
69. Id. at 434-35.
70. Id. at 441 (quoting Yakima Indian Nation Amended Zoning Regulations No. 1-98-72,
§ 23 (1972)).
71. Id. at 444, 447.
72. Id. at 460 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in No. 87-1622 and dissenting in
Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711).
73. Id. at 464-65.
74. Id. at 465 (citation omitted).
75. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
76. Id. at 692.
77. Id. at 688.
78. Id. at 685-86.
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worked for the tribe,79 and his victim Biscuit Brown, also a resident of the
reservation but a member of the Gila River Pima Maricopa Community, a
historically related but distinct Indian tribe,80 helped shape the texture of
daily life, were excluded from this vision of tribal governments acting only
to preserve unique customs untouched by time.
The Court's concerns about the justice dispensed by tribal governments
complemented this narrow conception of tribal sovereignty. The Court
emphasized that nonmember Indians were citizens, and, like non-Indians,
were "embraced within our Nation's 'great solicitude that its citizens be
protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."' 8
Rather than point to a legal basis for making the distinction between
nonmembers and members, who were also, after all, citizens, the majority
declared that the "special nature of the tribunals at issue" justified its focus
on consent and citizenship. 2 Tribal courts, the Court declared, were
"influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they
serve," 83 were often "subordinate to the political branches of tribal
governments," and their legal methods sometimes depended on "unspoken
practices and norms."84 It was also "significant that the Bill of Rights does
not apply to Indian tribal governments" and that the guarantees of the ICRA
were "not equivalent to their constitutional counterparts. ' '85
Duro's allusions to the Bill of Rights went to the Court's policy-based
uneasiness with tribal power, rather than the legal basis of the decision
itself. The Court confirmed that it did not see its opinion as having a
constitutional basis by inviting Congress to overrule it.86 Congress
79. Id. at 679.
80. Id.; FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 94-96 (1996).
81. Duro, 495 U.S. at 692 (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
210 (1978)).
82. Id. at 693. In the one piece of legal support for this distinction, the Court later pointed
to dicta in United States v. Rogers that non-Indians by adoption into an Indian tribe could
"become entitled to certain privileges in the tribe, and make himself amenable to their laws and
usages." Id. at 694 (quoting United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846)). But
this language was in the context of stating that adoption was not enough to allow a non-Indian
to be treated as an Indian with respect to federal criminal jurisdiction, and thus suggests that
adoption should not make a difference with respect to federal law. See Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
at 573 ("It can hardly be supposed that Congress intended to" treat whites "adopted" by Indians
as fitting within the Indian-against-Indian exception).
83. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
84. Id. (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 334-35 (The
Michie Co. 1982) [hereinafter 1982 COHEN]).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 698 ("If the present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the
practical needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to address the problem is
Congress, which has the ultimate authority over Indian affairs."). The Supreme Court is the final
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responded with alacrity.87 Six months after the Court issued the decision,
Congress amended the definition of tribal "powers of self-government" in
the ICRA to include, "the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians."88 In spring of 2004, the Supreme Court upheld the Duro Fix
against a constitutional challenge in United States v. Lara.89
D. To the Present: Consolidating the Denial of Jurisdiction but Upholding
the Congressional Reprieve
Despite this congressional rebuke, post-Duro cases have gone even
further in limiting tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. 90 In 1997, in Strate
v. A-] Contractors9' the Court unanimously held that a tribal court had no
jurisdiction over a personal injury action against a non-Indian arising from
an accident on a state highway running through the reservation.92 Although
the Court acknowledged that "[u]ndoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on
a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity,
and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members," 93 it held that "requiring
authority on the meaning of the United States Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). Where the Court rules based upon its understanding of the
Constitution, therefore, Congress has no power to second guess it. Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (where Court rules in Constitutional cases "correction through
legislative action is practically impossible") (citations omitted).
87. See Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b)-(c), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990); see also
United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing legislative history of
Duro Fix).
88. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000), originally enacted at Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b)-(c),
104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990).
89. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
90. One might think that the congressional reversal would make the Court re-evaluate
whether its tribal jurisdiction opinions in fact reflect federal common law. But after Duro the
Court lost its strongest advocates for tribal sovereignty, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
Blackmun. Recent opinions suggest that some members of the Court are becoming more
familiar with Indian law and Indian tribes, and are at least grappling with precedent and the
needs of modem tribes. See, in particular, the various opinions and concurrences in United
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). This aspect of the Lara decision is discussed in Bethany R.
Berger, U.S. v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV. 5, 22-23 (2004) and Philip
P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School
Library). But in general, the new members of the Court seem to have easily accepted that tribal
jurisdiction means subjection to an unfamiliar government, in which nonmembers have no voice
and are at a disadvantage, and that tribal sovereignty is limited to the protection of a traditional,
insular culture, and does not extend to the needs of modem, changing governments.
91. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 457-58.
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A-1 and Stockert to defend against this commonplace state highway
accident claim in an unfamiliar court is not crucial to 'the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the [Three Affiliated
Tribes]."' 94 Two related ideas are embedded in this phrase. First, non-
Indians are at a disadvantage in "unfamiliar" tribal courts, and so should
only rarely be called before them. 95 Second, the need to exercise jurisdiction
over the "commonplace" stuff of government is not properly a tribal matter.
To be protected, tribal interests cannot be commonplace, but must satisfy
judicial notions of what is uniquely tribal.
In 2001, the Court further reshaped Indian law to deny tribes
"commonplace" governmental powers in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley.96
There, the Court held that the Navajo Nation had no jurisdiction to impose a
hotel tax on non-Indian guests at a hotel owned by a non-Indian on fee land
on the Navajo reservation. 97 Although Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe98
declared that tribes had general authority to impose taxes to control
economic activity within their territory and defray the cost of providing
government services, 99 Atkinson dismissed this language as dicta.' ° The
Merrion justification for jurisdiction was rejected because otherwise "the
exception would swallow the rule: All non-Indian fee lands within a
reservation benefit, to some extent, from the 'advantages of a civilized
society' offered by the Indian tribe."'0 ' As in Strate, the right of tribes to act
as modern sovereigns was denied in favor of the need to ensure that few, if
any, non-Indians would be subject to their jurisdiction.
In the same term, in Nevada v. Hicks,10 2 the Court pushed the
presumption against tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers even further,
94. Id. at 459 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)) (footnote
omitted).
95. The Court reinforced this idea by referring in a footnote to the rule that nonresident
defendants may remove cases filed in state court to federal court, Id. at 459 n.13 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1441), an allusion to the idea, now largely discredited, that local courts will be biased
against non-resident defendants. Of course the result in Strate went beyond this removal option:
the Court did not grant A-1 the right of removal, but instead denied Gisela Fredericks the option
of having the case heard by the court in her place of residence altogether. Nor do the two
provisions stem from the same source: federal diversity jurisdiction is based on a Congressional
statute explicitly providing for such jurisdiction; limitations on inherent tribal civil jurisdiction
are founded on vague judicial ideas of tribal sovereignty that often conflict with congressional
policy.
96. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
97. Id. at 649.
98. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
99. Id. at 141.
100. 532 U.S. at 652-53.
101. Id. at 655 (quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-38).
102. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
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holding that even on tribally owned trust land, tribal courts did not have
jurisdiction over a lawsuit by a tribal member against state officials for
damages allegedly committed in searching his house.' °3 The majority
opinion focused almost solely on the harm to state interests should tribes
exercise jurisdiction over the execution of state warrants for crimes
committed off the reservation.'° With little other justification than this
potential harm, the Court held that "tribal authority to regulate state officers
in executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is
not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations.' ' 5
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, concurred to
urge the Court to go further still, to hold that "at least as a presumptive
matter, tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over nonmembers."' 6 The
concurrence declared that the "special nature of [Indian] tribunals"' 7 and
the "overriding concern that citizens who are not tribal members be
'protected . .. from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty"'
justified this presumption.108
In 2004, however, the Court resisted an opportunity to enshrine its
nonmember jurisdiction opinions in constitutional law. In United States v.
Lara, the Court upheld the Duro Fix legislation affirming inherent tribal
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.'0 9 Although the statute
concerned jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, the Court did not restrict
the scope of this power to jurisdiction over Indians."l0 Nor did it suggest that
this power was limited to cases in which the Supreme Court had somehow
gotten its history wrong in saying such jurisdiction did not exist."' While
the Court pointedly did not decide whether the Duro Fix violated equal
protection or due process rights of defendants," 12 it left room for Congress to
reconsider and reject judicial abrogation of tribal jurisdiction.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 364-65. This harm was wholly hypothetical. State officials assumed that tribal
approval was needed for states to execute warrants on tribal lands, and the tribal courts readily
approved the warrants. Id. at 356. In the case at hand, this accommodation was actually of
benefit to the state;. after the tribal courts approved execution of the state warrant, tribal police
assisted the state wardens in their search, and later provided evidence leading to the second
warrant and search. Id. at 356; id. at 397 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that state and tribal
officials "acted in full cooperation to investigate an off-reservation crime").
105. Id. at 364 (majority opinion).
106. Id. at 376-77 (Souter, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 383 (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990)).
108. Id. at 384 (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978)).
109. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
110. Berger, supra note 90, at 10.
111. Id.
112. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 at 209. The Ninth Circuit, in a case arising from the Navajo
Nation's exercise of jurisdiction over the Oglala Lakota Russell Means, held that the Duro Fix
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Tribal courts also retain significant jurisdiction over nonmembers in
other areas. For many nonmember plaintiffs, tribal court is the only option.
Lawsuits arising on a reservation in which the defendant is a tribal member
can only be heard in tribal fora. 3 Actions against tribes themselves must
also be brought in tribal courts absent a waiver of tribal sovereign
immunity.1 4 Despite the actions of the Supreme Court, therefore, the
numbers of cases in which nonmember litigants appear in tribal courts will
only increase as tribes and their members become increasingly involved in
commercial and other relationships with iionmembers.
Where defendants or subjects of tribal jurisdiction are nonmembers,
however, much has been taken away and less is clearly protected. The
Supreme Court has decided questions regarding nonmember jurisdiction on
an incremental, case-by-case basis, and has established few firm rules.
Rather, it has acted in accordance with its assumptions about what tribal
court adjudication of nonmembers means both for those considered
outsiders and those considered insiders to the tribes. The answer in both
cases is the same: nothing good. Nonmembers will find themselves at a
disadvantage, and tribes will not appreciably gain in self-government by the
exercise. The remainder of this Article examines these assumptions.
III. THE EXPERIENCE OF OUTSIDERS IN THE NAVAJO NATION APPELLATE
COURTS
The empirical part of this project examines decisions involving outsiders
in the Navajo Nation appellate court. This examination reveals the court to
be surprisingly balanced in hearing the rights of outsiders, even in areas that
might appear particularly prone to bias.
A. Data
The study examines decisions issued by the Navajo appellate court
(whose name changed from the Navajo Court of Appeals to the Navajo
Supreme Court in the 1980s) between January 1969, when the court began
issuing written opinions, and December 2004. The source of the decisions is
did not violate Equal Protection or Due Process guarantees. Means v. Navajo Nation, 420 F.3d
1037 (9th Cir. 2005).
113. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
114. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998). Although
tribes have immunity in their own courts as well, many have by statute or tribal court decision
authorized suits against the tribe in tribal court. See Newton, supra note 8, at 311-12 n.100,
338-41 (discussing tribal waivers of sovereign immunity).
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the online database available at www.versuslaw.com. Unlike the other
major source of tribal court opinions, the Indian Law Reporter, VersusLaw
appears to publish every decision submitted to it. And unlike many tribes,
the Navajo Nation appears to submit all of its non-summary appellate
opinions." 5 Over the time period, the Navajo appellate court issued 534
opinions. Potential limitations in this data source are discussed below.
1. The Navajo Nation Court System
The experience of nonmembers on the Navajo Nation is
disproportionately important in evaluating the experience of nonmembers in
tribal legal systems generally. With 13% of the total Indian population in
the United States and about one-third of the total land base over which any
tribe may exercise jurisdiction, the Navajo legal system potentially has
jurisdiction over a significant proportion of disputes regarding nonmembers
arising on reservations. It also expends significant resources in exercising
this jurisdiction; it has, for example, four times more full time law
enforcement officers than any other tribe. 16 Not surprisingly, therefore, the
Navajo Nation figures prominently in the debates and litigation concerning
jurisdiction and nonmembers. Many of the Supreme Court's most important
jurisdictional cases-Williams v. Lee,"' Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm'n,"8 McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz.," 9 United
States v. Wheeler,20 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of
N.M. ,12' Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians,122 and Atkinson
115. For a period in the 1970s and 1980s, the court submitted all of its orders, including, for
example, decisions dismissing cases on the stipulation of the parties, pro forma orders accepting
the Navajo Nation Bar Association's recommendations for bar admissions, and one paragraph
decisions dismissing appeals for failure to file in a timely manner. In 1987, however, Navajo
Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 became effective. The rule divides decisions into three
categories: (1) opinions, (2) memorandum decisions, and (3) orders. NAVAJO R. App. P. 22.
Only "opinions" are published in the Navajo Reporter or submitted to versus law. Since that
time, the court has issued approximately twelve opinions per year.
116. STEPHEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 203097, AMERICAN INDIANS AND
CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL SURVEY PROFILE, 1992-2002, at 26 (2004). Given the large size of
its reservation, however, it still has only one officer per every 100 square miles within its
jurisdiction. Id.
117. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
118. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
119. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
120. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
121. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
122. 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
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Trading Co. v. Shirley12 3 -have arisen on the Navajo Nation, and the Nation
is an important voice in current discussions on the subject.
There are disadvantages in focusing on the Navajo Nation, as there
would be in focusing on any single tribe. The United States recognizes at
least 562 Indian tribes and Alaska Native villages. 24 While some tribes,
such as the various Sioux peoples of the Dakotas and the midwest, reflect
federal divisions of single tribes,' 5 most have different indigenous
languages and cultures. Tribes also have vastly different physical and social
circumstances. While the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, the most populous
tribe, has over 300,000 members, 26 most tribes have fewer than 1,000
members and many have fewer than 100. Their land bases also differ
widely. While the Navajo Nation is the approximate size of West Virginia,
and several other reservations rival the land base of Connecticut or Rhode
Island, many other reservations encompass only a few hundred acres. In
addition, 226 of the 562 tribes recognized by the United States are Alaska
Native Villages, most of whose land is not considered "Indian country,"'27
the territory within which most of the special jurisdictional rules of Indian
law apply.'28 Generalizations are therefore dangerous.
The Supreme Court, however, has created general tests for tribal
jurisdiction. While it has left open the possibility that individual treaties and
laws may create different rules, in practice it has given short shrift to legal
or factual differences between tribes. The failure of one tribe, particularly
one of the size and significance of the Navajo Nation, to conform to its
judicial assumptions should make the Court more cautious in assuming a
policy-making role with respect to tribal jurisdiction.
In addition, all tribes struggle with the problem of establishing legitimate
and just governmental systems in the face of a history of American
colonialism. A close study of the challenges this poses to one tribal legal
123. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
124. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 67 Fed. Reg. 46328 (July 12, 2002). The term "tribe" is
inappropriate for the 226 Alaskan Native Entities, which prefer the term "Native Village," and
is rejected by some other groups on the list, which prefer the term "nation." As a generic term,
however, I generally use the term "tribe" for the sake of clarity and simplicity.
125. See 1982 COHEN, supra note 84, at 6.
126. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TOP 25 AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES FOR THE UNITED STATES:
1990 AND 1980 (1995), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/race/indian/
ailangl .txt.
127. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 526-34 (1998).
128. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 n.5 (1987)
(stating that definition of Indian country comes from 18 U.S.C. § 1151, and defines both civil
and criminal jurisdiction).
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system is therefore meaningful both for other tribes and for judges and
policy makers considering tribal jurisdiction.
The Navajo Nation, moreover, is a paradigmatic example of the kind of
tribal court system the Court is concerned about. While students of tribal
courts often look to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court as a model, in some
ways it seems a breeding ground for the horror stories about tribal court
systems. All of the judges, at both the trial and Supreme Court levels, are
Navajo. 29 One of the qualifications for judicial service is fluency in the
Navajo language, 30 effectively ensuring that judges will be drawn from the
more traditional portion of the population. A J.D., however, is not a
requirement for a judgeship,' 31 and only a minority of Supreme Court
justices, and even fewer trial court judges, have been law school
graduates. 132
The court has also pioneered one of the bugaboos of opponents of tribal
jurisdiction over outsiders: the incorporation of tribal customary or common
law in dispute resolution. 133 Navajo customary or common law is
"comprised of customs and long-used ways of doing things"'134 that gain the
status of law, like the Anglo common law catalogued by Blackstone.
1 35
Since the judicial reforms of 1959, the Navajo Code has provided for use of
Navajo customary law in legal proceedings, 36 and judicial opinions have
129. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 354(1) (1985).
130. § 354(5).
131. § 354(3) (applicants must have minimum of high school education). Applicants must
also have a minimum of two years experience in a law related area. § 354(4).
132. In 2002, three out of eighteen Navajo court judges were law school graduates.
Hearing, supra note 4, at 97 n.16 (testimony of Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of the Navajo
Nation). One of the most influential and successful panels of justices (that of Justices Tom Tso,
Homer Bluehouse, and Raymond Austin) had only one law school graduate. See Jim Maniaci &
Din6 Bereau, Panel Extend's Justice's Probation; King-Ben Gets Year to Get Better, GALLUP
INDEPENDENT, July 3, 2003, available at http://www.gallupindependent.com/2003/07-03-
03king-ben.html.
133. For a fine and nuanced article on the tribal common law movement, see Christine Zuni
Cruz, Tribal Law as Indigenous Social Reality and Separate Consciousness-IRe]Incorporating
Customs and Traditions into Tribal Law, I TRIBAL L.J. 1 (2000), http://tlj.unm.edu/articles/
volume_ 1/zunicruz.
134. Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 225, 230
(1989) [hereinafter Tso, The Process of Decision Making].
135. In re Estate of Belone (Dawes v. Yazzie), 5 Navajo Rptr. 161 (1987).
136. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 204 (1977) provided that:
(a) In all civil cases the Court of the Navajo Tribe shall apply any laws of
the United States that may be applicable, any authorized regulations of the
Interior Department, and any ordinance or customs of the Tribe, not
prohibited by such Federal laws.
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discussed custom since the Navajo Nation began publishing opinions in
1969.137 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the justices of the Navajo Nation
began to place new emphasis on Navajo common law, applying it beyond
the domestic relations arena in which its use had always been sanctioned, to
questions of judicial review, 38 personal injury lawsuits, 139 and restrictions
on freedom of speech. 40 Today, common law is the "law of preference" in
the Navajo courts. 4' The tribal common law movement is, at some level, a
rejection of Anglo-American standards as the best or most appropriate way
to resolve disputes arising on reservations, and the use of such customary
law helps to undergird the sense that tribal courts are unfamiliar, foreign
places, where those not part of the traditional culture will find themselves at
a disadvantage. 142
One might also expect that because of the unique circumstances of the
Navajo Nation, adjudication of the rights of nonmembers would play a
relatively small role in Navajo law. In contrast to the majority of
reservations, very little of this vast reservation has been "allotted" or sold
by the United States to non-Indian settlers. While on heavily allotted
reservations, a substantial proportion and sometimes the vast majority of
residents may be non-Indian, Navajos compose over 90% percent of the
reservation population. 43 Only 3.5% of the 145,843 people living on the
(b) Where any doubt arises as to the customs and usages of the Tribe, the
court may request the advice of counselors familiar with these customs and
usages.
(c) Any matters that are not covered by the traditional customs and
usages of the Tribe, or by applicable Federal laws and regulations, shall be
decided by the Court of the Navajo Tribe according to the laws of the state in
which the matter in dispute may lie.
Ironically, this provision is in large part the product of federal influence-this language was
taken essentially verbatim from the federal code of regulations for tribal courts. As part of the
court reforms of 1985, the Navajo Nation reenacted this choice of law provision and modified it
to make clear that it applied in all cases, not simply civil ones, and that in cases where Navajo
and federal law were silent the court "may" not "shall" apply local state law. NAVAJO NATION
CODE tit. 7, § 204 (1985).
137. In re Trust of Benally, I Navajo Rptr. 10, 12 (1969). See generally Daniel L. Lowery,
Developing a Tribal Common Law Jurisprudence: The Navajo Experience, 1969-1992, 18 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 379 (1993) (discussing development of common law in the Navajo courts).
138. Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Navajo Rptr. 189, 203-06 (1978).
139. See Benally v. Navajo Nation, 5 Navajo Rptr. 209 (Window Rock D. Ct. 1986).
140. Navajo Nation v. Crockett, 7 Navajo Rptr. 237, 240-43 (1996).
141. Navajo Nation v. Platero, 6 Navajo Rptr. 422, 424 (1991).
142. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001)
(Souter, J., concurring).
143. NAVAJO NATION, Div. OF CMTY. DEV., 1990 CENSUS POPULATION AND HOUSING
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NAVAJO NATION, tbl.NN04 (1993).
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reservation are non-Indian, and only 6.5% are nonmember Indians.' 4 And
although Native Americans in general are the most exogamous of American
ethnic groups, a fairly small proportion of the on-reservation Navajo
population marries outside the tribe. 1
45
Navajo custom and tradition also remain deeply embedded in daily life.
The appropriate way to introduce oneself, for example, is to give not only
one's name, but the clans of one's mother, father, and grandparents,
acknowledging not only one's individuality, but one's traditional heritage
and relationships. 4 6 While ensuring the vitality of the Navajo language
among younger members is a concern for the tribe, as it is for most tribes
with living languages, as of 1990 Navajo was spoken at home by 142,886
members of the Navajo Nation, 147 and it is still the only language of many
Navajo elders.
The Navajo Nation is almost unique in its degree of social and
geographic independence from non-Navajo society. Interactions with
outsiders might seem to compose little of the work of the courts and to be
relatively unimportant to Navajo self-government. The Navajo Nation thus
provides an excellent opportunity to test the accuracy of the Supreme
Court's vision of tribes as largely isolated from nonmembers and needing
only to preserve customs and culture unrelated to the outside world.
2. Appellate Decisions
There are also disadvantages in focusing on appellate decisions. Written
appellate decisions are not necessarily representative of disputes in a
particular society. Individuals transform only a small fraction of disputes
into articulated grievances and a smaller fraction of those into legal actions;
an even smaller fraction of those result in litigated legal decisions and a yet
144. Id.
145. During my time working with parents and children on the Navajo Nation, I more than
once heard of Navajo children mocking children with mixed Navajo/white parentage as "half-
breeds," a phenomenon that would be unheard of on most reservations outside the Southwest
because of the high rates of intermarriage.
146. See, e.g., Claudeen Bates Arthur, The Role of the Tribal Attorney, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 21,
21 (2002). In beginning her remarks, Bates Arthur provided her clan (which is her mother's
clan), and the clans of her father and her grandparents, saying, "[t]hat is who I really am." Id.
The importance of these traditional ties is also reflected in the saying to condemn the behavior
of an individual, "[hie acts like he has no relatives." Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of Navajo
Labor Relations, 6 Navajo Rptr. 246, 264 (1990).
147. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN INDIANS BY TRIBE AND
LANGUAGE: 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION 874 tbl. 18 (1994).
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smaller fraction result in appellate decisions. 48 Although there is an
intuitive sense that reported decisions reflect the underlying activity in
society, the relationship between activity, litigation, and decisions is not so
direct. 49 Not all injuries are sensed as wrongs, and even fewer as legal
wrongs. Disputes litigated to decision are more likely than others to involve
"hard cases," those in which both parties predict relatively equal chances of
success. 50  In addition, as discussed further below, litigation
disproportionately reflects situations in which there is no common
agreement on the way disputes should be resolved, or in which the parties
do not have common social ground, resulting in a turn to formal legal
institutions for resolution. 5'
This lack of representativeness, however, is not a significant problem for
the study. While many disputes do not even come before the courts, it is
tribal formal legal institutions that have come under the scrutiny and
criticism of the United States Supreme Court. More important, it is perhaps
more relevant in determining the relative bias of the courts to see what they
do in adjudicating hard cases rather than easy ones. The indirect
relationship between disputes and litigated claims, moreover, only increases
the likelihood that disputes that are litigated reflect the friction points in
society, the areas in which parties feel themselves particularly aggrieved
and need to turn to a hopefully objective third party for resolution.
In addition, to the extent one can tell from the published trial court
decisions and discussions of the decisions below in the appellate court
148. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 4, 11-36 (1983) (discussing the "dispute pyramid" of grievances to litigation). This is
certainly true for the Navajo court system. Although 70,338 cases were filed in the Navajo
courts in the 2001-2002 fiscal year, only 65 cases were filed in the Navajo Supreme Court, and
the court issued only 14 published decisions. JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE NAVAJO NATION,
ANNUAL REPORT ON FISCAL YEAR 2002, 22 (2003).
149. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ... , 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 631
(1981) (discussing factors in transformation of disputes into litigation).
150. The seminal article articulating this theory is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
151. See infra Part IV.A; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 144 (1975); David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders,
and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 551 (1987), reprinted
in THE LAW & SOCIETY READER 13, 21-22, 32-33 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1995) (stating that
plaintiffs in personal injury lawsuits were outsiders to rural Illinois community; insiders either
chose not to litigate or were able to quickly settle their disputes); Sally Engle Merry, Going to
Court: Strategies of Dispute Management in an American Urban Neighborhood, 13 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 891 (1979), reprinted in THE LAW & SOCIETY READER 36, 38-40 (Richard L. Abel
ed., 1995) (suggesting that reliance on court in urban housing project reflected different ethnic
groups with little social common ground).
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decisions, the primary differences between trial and appellate level
decisions are not the degrees of bias against nonmembers. Like lower courts
anywhere, the trial level courts are more concerned with resolving disputes
and avoiding reversal than the appellate court.'52 And although in a few
instances decisions against nonmembers below seem to violate legal
principles accepted by the Navajo courts, 1 3 the differences between the trial
and appellate courts appear to reflect different visions of the role of the
court rather than greater or lesser bias against nonmembers. Thus, while the
appellate court has reversed decisions that the Navajo courts lacked
jurisdiction over claims against non-Indians, these decisions appear
motivated by the belief that the court has and should have broad jurisdiction
over all actions arising on the reservation rather than bias against the
nonmember.'54 Similarly, the appellate court appears to have a greater
preference for the application of Navajo common law and has remanded
decisions in favor of non-Indians where it held that state law rather than
common law inappropriately formed the rule of decision.
15
B. Who Wins When Nonmembers Go Before the Courts?
To determine who won and lost when nonmembers appeared before the
Navajo appellate courts, the online opinions were reviewed first to eliminate
the few published district court opinions and the duplicate opinions. Each of
the remaining opinions was reviewed to determine which involved parties
that could be identified as involving nonmembers of the tribe, whether
because the opinion identifies them as such, because of the names of the
parties, because of knowledge of the parties, or because of the status and
location of the parties.156 Where the identity of the litigants could not be
152. Email from James W. Zion, former Navajo Nation Solicitor (May 10, 2005, 16:17
EST) (on file with author).
153. See, for example, Deal v. Blatchford, 3 Navajo Rptr. 159, 162-63 (1982), in which the
appellate court reversed the trial court for granting punitive damages of $250 and compensatory
damages against a non-Indian found liable for a car accident without evidence that the act was
willful or malicious or evidence of the financial damages other than the plaintiffs' testimony.
(The decision as to liability seems straightforward-the non-Indian hit the plaintiffs car with
her motorcycle while the plaintiff was stopped at a red light.)
154. See, e.g., In re A.O., 5 Navajo Rptr. 121 (1987) (reversing dismissal of custody case
for lack of jurisdiction and remanding for more facts).
155. See, e.g., Nez v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 7 Navajo Rptr. 416, 420-21 (1999).
156. In doing this, I assumed that litigants with common Navajo names such as Kee,
Yazzie, or Begay were Navajo, absent other evidence to the contrary, and that off-reservation
businesses, such as Babbitt Ford, were non-Indian. In more difficult cases, I did research
regarding the party before determining whether they were Navajo. For example, where Edker
Wilson, a provider of livestock for rodeos, was sued for injuries caused by one of his bulls at the
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determined to a reasonable degree of certainty, the case was assumed to
involve only Navajos.
Through this method, 122 cases involving non-Navajo litigants were
identified. Ten of these cases involve Indians that are not members of the
Navajo Nation, and the rest, 91.8% of the total, involve non-Indians. The
cases were read and categorized as to who won or lost the case and the
subject matter of the case. The cases run the gamut in subject matter; they
include, for example, cases regarding contracts, torts, child custody,
employment law, practice of law, trusts and estates, and taxation. The
majority of cases involve non-Indian companies, whether as employers,
vendors, alleged tortfeasors, taxpayers, or insurers. In the vast majority,
both sides had representation drawn from the same pool of local attorneys
and advocates.
Out of these cases, in sixteen, no contested issues were decided or the
results were too mixed to say one party won or lost. 57 In five, non-Navajos
were on both sides, and in six, non-Navajos and Navajos were on the same
side. The remaining 95 cases were almost equally divided: in 45 cases, or
47.4% of the total, the non-Navajo party won, and in 50, or 52.6% of the
total, the non-Navajo party lost. Until the last few years, when non-Indians,
encouraged by recent federal decisions restricting tribal civil jurisdiction,
have repeatedly challenged Navajo jurisdiction and the court has repeatedly
rejected these challenges, 158 the win-loss rate was 50-50. The results are
shown in Table I.
Northern Navajo Fair, see Wilson v. Begay, 6 Navajo Rptr. 1 (1988), I found an article profiling
him before categorizing him as a nonmember. Similarly, for on-reservation businesses such as
Dilcon Westerner Stores, I found a speech describing the owner, Michael Nelson, as a Navajo
businessman before categorizing him.
157. These included, for example, cases in which the decision simply reported that the
matter had been dismissed by stipulation of the parties, cases responding to requests for
opinions on certified questions, and cases in which the Supreme Court simply certified the
presentation of candidates for admission to the bar. They also, however, included a few
substantive cases such as Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98, 2000 NANN
0000003, 63 (Navajo Jan. 14, 2000) (VersusLaw), in which the court affirmed that the tribe
had jurisdiction over a non-Indian employer and that the employer had failed to create an
atmosphere free from harassment, but reversed the damages, civil penalty, and the award of
attorney fees because it agreed with the employer that requiring it to prove substantial
justification for firing the employee by clear and convincing evidence violated due process and
that the civil penalty was improper.
158. In the last five years, for example, the Navajo Supreme Court rejected at least three
non-Indian or nonmember Indian challenges to its jurisdiction. See Nelson v. Pfizer, Inc., No.
SC-CV-01-02, 2003 NANN 0000002, 35 (Navajo Nov. 17, 2003) (VersusLaw); Office of
Navajo Labor Relations ex rel. Jones v. Central Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 22, No. SC-CV-13-98,
2003 NANN 0000007, 28 (Navajo June 5, 2003) (VersusLaw); Means v. Dist. Court of the
Chinle Judicial Dist., No. SC-CV-61-98, 1999 NANN 0000013, [n 68, 82 (Navajo May 11,
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Table I: Win-Loss Rate of Nonmembers
1969- 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 Total
74159 -79 -84 -89 -94 -99 -04
Nonmember wins 2 8 12 7 3 6 7 5
Nonmember loses 2 2 11 6 10 9 10 50
No win/loss or results 2 7 2 2 1 2 16
substantially mixed
Nonmembers both 1 1 1 2 5
sides
Nonmember & 2 2 1 1 6
Navajo same side
Total cases 4 12 33 17 17 18 21 122
This balance is consistent across the various kinds of disputes. Whether
the issue is child custody, torts, contracts, or employment, Navajo litigants
win some, and non-Navajo litigants win some. This is true whether the
court is deciding on procedural or substantive grounds, whether the decision
affirms or reverses the district court, even whether the opposing party is the
Navajo Nation or not.
According to an influential and controversial theory developed by
George Priest and Benjamin Klein, this balanced win-loss rate is what one
would expect from litigated decisions." Assuming that parties have
relatively accurate information regarding their chances of success, they will
settle or fail to pursue cases in which they agree that one party is
significantly more likely to win.161 It is only where the likely outcome is
subject to a large degree of uncertainty, and each party appears to have a
relatively equal ability to win, that cases will be litigated. Other factors
being equal,' 62 therefore, one would expect the results to approach a 50-50
1999) (VersusLaw). Without the losses on the jurisdictional appeals in those cases, nonmembers
would have won the same number of cases as they lost during that period.
159. Dates are calculated between January 1 of the initial year and January 1 of the
concluding year.
160. Priest & Klein, supra note 150, at 51-52.
161. The theory was developed and has been tested in the context of plaintiffs and
defendants. There is no reason, however, that it should not work with any two sets of parties. If
nonmembers and Navajos each are making equally good estimates of their chances of success,
absent some distorting factor such as bias, the rates of success when they litigate against each
other should be 50-50. In fact, the rates of success of some randomly chosen group, say red-
headed people, should more consistently approach the 50 percent figure because there should be
fewer factors relevant to litigation behavior consistent across red-headed people than there
might be for the group of plaintiffs as a whole.
162. Differing stakes between the parties, for example, will shift their interest in litigation,
and therefore may shift the proportion of cases won by any party. Priest & Klein, supra note
150, at 26. Repeat players in litigation systems, moreover, should have greater flexibility in
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win-loss rate for any set of parties.'63 Recent scholarship suggests that much
of the divergence from the 50-50 rate in practice can be explained by
asymmetric information between the parties.1"4 In other words, a party who
is better able to calculate her chances of success or failure than her
opponent will be better able to litigate only when she will win.
Following this theory, this relatively balanced win-loss rate tends to
suggest that non-Navajo parties are at least as good at predicting their
chances of success as are Navajo parties. This, in turn, undermines the
assertion that nonmembers should not be subject to the jurisdiction of the
non-Indian courts because they are "unfamiliar" places'65 whose laws are
"unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out."' 66  It also tends to
undermine the assumption that the courts are unfair to these outsiders.
Where judges are influenced by legally irrelevant factors such as bias
against a particular kind of party or claim, it skews the results. Parties that
make an accurate assessment of the law and facts in their favor will
nevertheless lose disproportionate numbers of cases. While Priest and Klein
predicted that parties would adjust their litigation decisions to account for
bias, thus maintaining the balanced win-loss rate, subsequent studies do not
confirm their thesis. 167 Parties, even when aware of bias, appear to over rely
choosing not to litigate cases in which the facts may lead to negative outcomes, and therefore
may be expected to win a greater proportion of cases litigated. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-
104 (1974). Empirical studies have shown significant deviation from the 50% rule in a number
of areas. See Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the
Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 233, 242 (1996) (summarizing studies). Kessler et al., however, argue that their
data provides support for the 50% rule when these factors are taken into account. Id. at 237-59.
163. Priest and Klein developed their hypothesis regarding the win-loss rate between
plaintiffs and defendants at the trial level; significant evidence suggests that it does not hold up
between appellants and appellees, as appellants must convince the court of an error below.
Kessler, Meites & Miller, supra note 162, at 242.
164. See Keith N. Hylton, An Asymetric-Information Model of Litigation, 22 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 153, 154, 167 (2002).
165. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
166. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 385 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
167. Kimberly A. Moore's study of patent litigation by foreigners provides a nice example
of this. Foreign patent holders were far less likely than domestic patent holders to litigate patent
claims, suggesting that they were litigating only their strongest claims both because of
perceived antiforeigner bias and the presumably higher litigation costs they faced in litigating in
a foreign country. Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1497, 1505 (2003). Nevertheless, foreign patent holders won only 38% of their jury claims
against domestic infringers, while domestic patent holders won 82% of claims against foreign
infringers. Id. at 1509. When claims were tried before judges, however, the domestic and
foreign patentees' success rates were almost identical, 35% versus 31%. Id. at 1509-10. The
foreign patent holders thus attempted to adjust their litigation behavior to reflect their concerns
about bias, but still were unable to accommodate the degree of bias they experienced. See also
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on their assessments that the law and facts are in their favor, and only very
slowly, if at all, effectively strategize to avoid a court biased against them.
Indian law cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court provide a nice
example of this. David Getches has calculated the win-loss rate of tribes in
Indian law cases decided by the United States Supreme Court.'68 He found
that while the win-loss rates in the Burger Court were relatively balanced
(with tribes winning 58% of the cases and losing 42%), tribal interests have
lost 77% of the Indian law cases decided by the Rehnquist court.169 It is only
now, after almost twenty years of this clear, extremely high-profile trend,
that tribes are actively seeking to avoid the United States Supreme Court,
and still find themselves often unable to do so as opposing parties refuse to
settle. 70 Bias in lower level courts should be even more difficult to detect
and address through litigation behavior.
Examining the win-loss rates according to whether the nonmembers
were appellants or appellees provides a fuller picture. Nonmembers were
somewhat more likely to be in the role of appellants, being in this position
about 58% of the time in cases in which there was a winner or loser. Other
studies have shown that appellant success rates are significantly less than
50%, '' which one might expect given that the appellant must prove error by
the lower court. Nonmember appellants won only about 26.5% of the time;
nonmember appellees lost 34% of the time.' Both of these figures are
similar to the 25 to 35% appellant win rates generally found in studies of
appellate litigation, 73 contributing to the suggestion that the Navajo
Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the
Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
1073, 1096-100 (1992) (plaintiffs disproportionately lost employment discrimination cases in
which defendants alleged a lack of interest defense); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore
Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37
UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990) (plaintiffs disproportionately lost products liability cases).
168. Getches, supra note 12, at 280.
169. Id.
170. See Tracy Labin, We Stand United Before the Court: The Tribal Supreme Court
Project, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 695, 696 (2003).
171. See, e.g., Kessler, Meites & Miller, supra note 162, at 242 (summarizing studies
regarding appellant success rates).
172. It is possible that the difference in these figures is explained in part by the recent
appeals by nonmembers of lower court decisions finding jurisdiction over them.
173. Kessler, Meites & Miller, supra note 162, at 252 (finding appellant success rates of
27.3%); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How
Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1174-75 (1991) (finding success of
appellants in 26, 27, 33, 35, 38, and 40% of appeals in various kinds of constitutional torts).
Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson recorded a remarkable divergence from this trend in race
and sex discrimination cases alleging a lack of interest defense, in which appellate courts
reversed findings of no discrimination because the plaintiff group was uninterested in
employment or promotion in 57.1 % of sex discrimination cases and 75% of race discrimination
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appellate court functions similarly to other appellate courts with respect to
cases involving nonmembers.
To summarize, the Navajo appellate courts are almost as likely to rule in
favor of nonmembers as they are to rule in favor of members, a figure
particularly striking given the fact that nonmembers are slightly more likely
to act as appellants in these cases. This figure suggests that parties are able
to make a relatively accurate assessment of their chances of winning before
the court, and that legally irrelevant factors do not significantly influence
the court's decisions in ways that disadvantage nonmembers. Indeed, a non-
Navajo going before the Navajo Supreme Court can be much more
confident of winning than can a tribe going before the highest court in the
land. While not conclusive as to the "fairness" of the courts, these statistics
should at least provide some reassurance to those concerned about bias.
C. Closer Analysis of Cases Vulnerable to Bias
Closer reading of the cases supplements the suggestion that the court is
acting in a relatively balanced manner. While not everyone would agree
with the reasoning or method of the court in every case (indeed almost by
definition each decision will disappoint a litigant who thought that he or she
should win) the cases appear uniformly governed by thoughtful attempts to
determine the relevant law, policies, and facts. There are some decisions in
which the court reaches questionable legal results, but the source of the
errors does not appear to be bias against the parties, nor do the errors
disproportionately disadvantage nonmembers. While I do discuss one
troubling custody case below, it appears that the basis of the decision was
Anglo common law. In other cases, the status of the litigant appears to have
made the court particularly careful to ensure fairness.
174
cases, a figure they attributed to the bias of the lower courts, and the relative zeal in the
appellate courts in addressing it in race and gender cases. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 167,
at 1133.
174. In re Practice of Battles, 3 Navajo Rptr. 92, 92-93 (1982), for example, considered a
challenge made by William Battles to a new rule that required membership in a state bar for
non-Navajos seeking to practice in the Navajo courts. (The rule is intended to ensure that the
courts will benefit from Navajo practitioners that either are educated in Navajo legal traditions
or can complement their lack of knowledge of such traditions with knowledge of Anglo law and
a legal education that enables them to familiarize themselves with unfamiliar laws.) Id. at 93.
Battles had practiced in the Navajo courts for several years and had passed the newly instated
Navajo bar exam two years before the rule was promulgated. Id. at 92. When Battles sought to
represent an individual challenging an extradition agreement between the Navajo Nation and the
State of Arizona, however, the Navajo prosecutor sought to disqualify him based on his
ineligibility to practice under the rule. Id. The court of appeals rejected this challenge. In the
words of the court:
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To supplement the above numbers, this section provides a closer
examination of decisions in three areas that one might expect to be tainted
by the biases or unfamiliarity of the courts: decisions involving Navajo
common law, decisions involving commercial relations, and custody
disputes involving custody of children with Navajo heritage.
1. Nonmember Decisions Involving Navajo Common Law
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly cited the use of
indigenous common law as a justification for denying tribal courts
jurisdiction over nonmembers.175 At the same time, it might seem that such
concepts would be relevant only to disputes that closely resemble those the
tribe engaged in pre-contact. 17 6 An examination of the use of one prominent
Navajo common law concept, that of nalyeeh, debunks the notion that
Mr. Battles is a rather controversial figure. He passed the first bar
examination administered by the Navajo Courts, along with 79 other
individuals. The following year Battles filed a $12.2 million lawsuit in our
courts against Raymond Tso, the prosecutor in this case. Later participation
in controversial suits, proceedings and disputes has made Battles a figure
disliked by some, but neither the decisions of the District Court nor this court
are based upon Mr. Battles' notoriety.
Id. at 92-93 (citations omitted). The court held that Battles' long practice in the Navajo Nation
courts gave him an equitable right to continue to practice there despite the new rule. Id. at 97.
(During my time on the Navajo Nation over a decade later, Mr. Battles continued to prosecute
in the Navajo courts, and was even a Domestic Violence Commissioner in the court system. He
was also a presenter in the mandatory course on Navajo Common Law for new bar members,
where he regaled students with stories of his $12.2 million lawsuit against the Navajo Nation.)
175. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (nonmember Indians should not be subject to
courts "influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they serve");
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978) (stating that non-Indians
should not be subject to a tribal court that "tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of
their people, nor the law of their land, but by ... a different race, according to the law of a
social state of which they have an imperfect conception" (quoting Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S.
556, 571 (1883))); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring); see also
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (non-Indian should not have to defend case
in "unfamiliar court").
176. Some tribes deliberately segregate the use of indigenous justice ways to more
"traditional" disputes. The Mohegan Tribe, for example, has two court systems, a Gaming
Disputes Court that hears cases arising from its successful casino and whose procedural and
substantive law closely mirror state and federal law, and a Mohegan Tribal Court, which hears
disputes concerning tribal members and which has more freedom to apply Mohegan common
law. See Newton, supra note 8, at 292 n.31. The Navajo Nation does something similar with its
Peacemaker Court, which hears primarily family disputes and whose procedures, hearkening to
traditional dispute resolution methods, involve an attempt to obtain consensus through talking
through of the problem with the mediation of an elder. James W. Zion & Robert Yazzie,
Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of Conquest, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 55,
80 (1997).
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indigenous common law need not and cannot be fairly applied to
contemporary disputes involving non-Indians. Indeed, in this example, the
use of common law adds to the fairness of the courts by creating legal
guarantees of justice in situations in which tribal codes have not yet created
them.
Nalyeeh is the traditional concept of making restitution for wrongs.177
The concept includes not only the compensation itself, but the proper
process for negotiating and making compensation. 17 8 The focus is distinctly
equitable:17 9 the concern is not with the amount of damages, but on what
kind and manner of restitution is "fair," so as to "fix the victim's mind."'8 °
Although the concept has long been part of traditional law practice on the
Navajo Nation,' 8' nalyeeh apparently first appeared in a written opinion in
1986.182 Benally v. Najajo Nation183 involved a wrongful death action
against the Navajo Nation by the mother of a Navajo child who died after
being hit by a truck driven by a tribal employee.' 84 The Navajo Nation
argued that that under Anglo common law there was no action for the
negligent death of a human being, so the right to bring such an action must
be provided by statute. 185 Although most states have enacted wrongful death
statutes, the Navajo Nation had not. But the district court held that the
common law concept of nalyeeh, under which Navajos could seek
compensation for the death of a relative, allowed the action to go forward.18 6
In addition, although traditionally nalyeeh damages were paid in livestock
and goods, the court recognized that "[m]ore Navajos work for money
today" and "[p]ayment in material goods is no longer adequate."'87
Since 1986, the Navajo courts have used nalyeeh to resolve a range of
distinctly modern disputes, including election of remedies in worker's
177. See Singer v. Nez, No. SC-CV-04-99, 2001 NANN 0000001 (Navajo July 16, 2001)
(VersusLaw); Benally v. Navajo Nation, 5 Navajo Rptr. 209 (Window Rock D. Ct. 1986).
178. Benalli v. First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am., 7 Navajo Rptr. 329, 338 n.3 (1998).
179. See id. (comparing concept of nalyeeh to English concept of equity).
180. Benally, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 212.
181. The efforts of parties and the Navajo police to resolve a rape case by negotiated
compensation rather than imprisonment almost led to a rebellion by the Navajo people in 1905,
AUBREY W. WILLIAMS, JR., THE NAVAJO POLITICAL PROCESS 14 (1970), and informants spoke
of current use of resolution according to nalyeeh in the early 1970s. DAN VICENTI, LEONARD B.
JIMSON, STEPHEN CONN, & M. J. L. KELLOGG, THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE: DINt BIBEE HAZ'AANIi,
A BICULTURAL APPROACH TO LEGAL EDUCATION FOR NAVAJO STUDENTS 121, 159, 198 (Ramah
Navajo High School Press 1972).
182. Benally, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 212.
183. 5 Navajo Rptr. 209.
184. Id. at 209.
185. Id. at 210.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 213.
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compensation cases, 88  "stacking" of uninsured motorist insurance
coverage,189 and requests for prejudgment interest in tort cases.'90 Seven out
of the eleven cases concerning nalyeeh now online involve non-Indians,
mostly as defendants. In three of the seven, the non-Indian party lost. In
Benalli v. First National Insurance Co., 91 the court used the concept of
nalyeeh as an aid in reading an insurance contract to find, against the
arguments of the non-Indian insurance company, that the insured driver of a
car in an accident with an uninsured motorist was entitled to stack the
uninsured motorist coverage provided in the policies of each of the
insured's cars in order to receive full compensation for her injuries. In
Jensen v. Giant Industries, Arizona, Inc.,192 the court reversed a grant of
summary judgment in favor of a non-Indian gas station chain that was sued
after the plaintiff (who may also have been non-Indian) was injured by a
third party in the parking lot of one of its stations. While Giant had argued
successfully below that nalyeeh prohibited recovery from third parties, the
court held that a single affidavit by a medicine man was not enough to
establish a common law prohibition on such recovery.' 93 The court
remanded for more evidence. 1
94
A non-Indian company also lost in Nez v. Peabody Western Coal Co.,
Inc.,' "95 in which the court reversed the dismissal of a suit by a Navajo who
sued his employer in tort after accepting worker's compensation for his
injuries. Federal law provides that state worker compensation schemes
apply to individuals working for private companies on federal lands, 196 and
courts have interpreted this provision to extend state compensation laws to
188. Benally v. Broken Hill Property Ltd., No. SC-CV-79-98, 2001 NANN 0000015, [
18-20 (Navajo Sept. 21, 2001) (VersusLaw).
189. See Benalli v. First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am., 7 Navajo Rptr. 329 (1998).
190. Singer v. Nez, No. SC-CV-04-99, 2001 NANN 0000001, T 38 (Navajo July 16, 2001)
(VersusLaw).
191. Benalli, 7 Navajo Rptr. at 329.
192. No. SC-CV-51-99, 2002 NANN 0000003, [ 33-34 (Navajo Jan. 22, 2002)
(VersusLaw).
193. In Jensen, the district court had granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor, in
part because the plaintiff had not presented evidence to rebut the evidence of the medicine man.
Id. at 20-21. The court found that to accept such evidence as binding on the court,
particularly without the court satisfying itself as to the expertise of the affiant, would contravene
the proper role of evidence regarding Navajo common law as a guide, rather than an adversarial
tool which must be rebutted. Id. at 23.
194. Id.
195. 7 Navajo Rptr. 416 (1999).
196. 40 U.S.C. § 3172 (2000).
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private employers in Indian country. 197 The Navajo Supreme Court agreed
with this interpretation, but held that just as the worker's compensation
remedies of one state did not automatically deprive another state of
jurisdiction over a common law tort based on the claims,'98 so the extension
of state workers compensation law did not deprive the Navajo Nation of
jurisdiction over claims for remedies that were "substantially different" than
the state scheme provided.' 99 The court vacated the dismissal and remanded
to the lower court. It suggested that Navajo law would bar the action if the
plaintiff had waived the right to seek further recovery, the action was barred
by collateral estoppel, or the action would unduly prejudice the defendant.2 °"
The court also left open for the district court the question whether Navajo
common law itself barred plaintiffs from seeking damages twice for the
same injuries."'
While the decision created significant concern regarding potential impact
on reservation employers,0 2 when the issue subsequently came before the
197. See Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that §
290, now § 3172, allows state workers' compensation laws to apply to employees of private
employers on Indian reservations).
198. Nez v. W. Peabody Coal, 7 Navajo Rptr. at 419 (citing Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408
(1955)) (holding that full faith and credit clause does not compel one state to enforce the
exclusive remedy provision of another state's workers' compensation law); id. (citing Garcia v.
American Airlines, Inc., 12 F.3d 308, 312-14 (1st Cir. 1993)) (holding that the forum state had
jurisdiction over an employee's common law tort suit even after the employee had received
benefits under another state's workers' compensation program).
199. Id. at 420.
200. Id. at 420-21.
201. Id. at 421.
202. This concern was significant enough that the Navajo Nation Council, four months after
the decision, enacted the following resolution:
1. The Navajo Nation Insurance Services Program Workers
Compensation Program is directed to begin development of a comprehensive
workers compensation statute to cover all employers operating within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.
2. Until such time as the Navajo Nation develops a comprehensive
workers compensation law covering all employers within the jurisdiction of
the Navajo Nation,.the Navajo Nation Council recognizes existing workers
compensation coverage, whether under a state statutory scheme or under
Navajo statutory law to be the exclusive remedy for covered injuries to
employees occurring in the work place.
Navajo Nation Council Res. CJA-18-00 (2000) (enacted).
The court rejected this apparent restriction on its institutional authority, holding that given
the presumption against ex post facto deprivations of remedies in existing cases and as the
resolution did not take the prescribed form legislative enactments, the resolution should be
interpreted as a statement of policy rather than a rule to be applied to pending cases. In re
Certified Question from the U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz., No. SC-CV-49-2000, 2001
NANN 0000011, I 25 (Navajo July 18, 2001) (VersusLaw); see Benally v. Big A Well
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court, it held that nalyeeh did not permit additional recovery.2 3 In Benally v.
Big A Well Service Co.,2°4 the first such case, the court emphasized that
nalyeeh had:
a deeper meaning of a demand to "make right" for an injury and
an invitation to negotiate what it will take so that an injured party
will have "no hard feelings" . . . . In most instances where an
employee receives a workers' compensation award, the nalyeeh
principle should be satisfied, because there is a method of
determining the nature of the injury and the monetary needs of the
worker.
•.. [S]uch benefits may not be the same as an award in a personal
injury action, but at the same time, workers have a prompt remedy,
they do not have to face the defenses of contributory or fellow
worker negligence, and costs in terms of money and time are
minimal.2 °5
In a subsequent case, the court elaborated on this reasoning, declaring
that while nalyeeh was similar to Anglo-American concepts of
compensation:
[Nalyeeh] is not simply a legal equitable doctrine to be applied by
a court as an impartial decision-maker, but a relationship value...
... We have said that Navajo common law requires people to keep
their word and honor their promises. In this particular situation,
the appellants' decedent went to work at a coal mine
understanding that if he was injured, the mining company would
pay for the injury under a workers' compensation program. The
appellants sought and received death benefits under that program,
and the company kept its word by paying them, as agreed. The
wrongful death suit attempted to reject the agreement the parties
reached and thus broke it. Accordingly, the district court was
correct in dismissing the wrongful death suit on equitable
principles as a matter of Navajo common law.20 6
Service, Co., No. SC-CV-27-99, 2000 NANN 0000002, 16 & n.1 (Navajo Aug. 28, 2000)
(VersusLaw).
203. Benally v. Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd., No. SC-CV-79-98, 2001 NANN 0000015, T
20 (Navajo Sept. 21, 2001) (VersusLaw); Big A Well Service, Co., No. SC-CV-27-99, 2000
NANN 0000002, at 20-21.
204. Big A Well Service, Co., No. SC-CV-27-99, 2000 NANN 0000002.
205. Id. at TT 22-23 (citations omitted).
206. Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd., No. SC-CV-79-98, 2001 NANN 0000015, at 20-21
(citations omitted).
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Thus, Navajo common law, far from a trap for the unwary in tribal
courts, became a tool to ensure comparable protections to those in state
courts, even in situations where tribal codes had not yet provided protection.
But by finding these guarantees in Navajo traditions, they become part of
the general code of conduct appropriate for the Navajo people rather than
foreign restrictions on action imposed because of a need to model non-
Indian courts.
2. Cases Arising from Business Relationships
The cases involving outsiders largely arise from business relationships, °7
the most common situation in which non-Indians find themselves in Navajo
courts. Sixty-five of the 122 cases involving non-Navajos, or approximately
53% of the total cases, arise from employment, contract, and worker's
compensation disputes alone. In most of these cases, non-Indians appear as
powerful institutions, employers, sellers, or lenders, while Navajos typically
appear in their individual status. The Navajo Nation has a significant
interest in protecting its members from predatory practices by such
institutions, and indeed has passed several laws, including a law prohibiting
self-help repossession without judicial approval2 8 and the Navajo
Preference in Employment Act,20 9 which prohibits termination of employees
without just cause, in order to protect Navajo individuals in their business
relationships. One might fear that this concern would result in bias against
such institutions when they appear in court. At least one litigant, the
Atkinson Trading Company, current owner of the Cameron Trading Post,
sought (unsuccessfully) to avoid exhausting a claim in tribal court by
arguing that the court was biased against it.
2 10
Review of the decisions regarding such cases reveals that the court is
balanced in hearing cases against non-Indian businesses. As reflected in the
chart below, after subtracting cases in which non-Navajos were on both
sides and there was no clear winner, non-Indian businesses won 31 of the
cases and lost 27. If the win/loss numbers are adjusted to include the two
cases in which Hopi employees were involved in disputes with non-Indian
businesses, both of which the Hopi litigants won, non-Indian businesses lost
29 of the cases.
207. For an article focusing on resolution of contract disputes on the Navajo Nation, see
Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dispute Resolution and Promissory Obligations: Continuity and
Change in the Largest Native American Nation, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1993).
208. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 621 (2005).
209. See id. tit. 15, §§ 601-619.
210. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 210 F.3d 1247, 1250-52 (10th Cir. 2000).
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Table II: Disputes Arising from Commercial Relationships with Non-Indians
Non- Non- Non-Navajos Results Total
Navajo Navajo on both sides mixed/ no
Won Lost win or loss
Contract-consumer 12 10 1 1 24
goods & services
Contract-with 3 5 8
Navajo Nation
Contract-other 1 2 3
Employment 12 9/11211 4 1 26
Worker's 3 1 4
compensation
Total 31 27/29212 2 65
Comparison of the likely results in state and federal courts provides
further evidence that non-Indian businesses are not overly disadvantaged in
the Navajo courts. Several of the cases regarding contracts for consumer
goods involve either federal or state consumer protection laws.21 3 These
cases provide an opportunity to examine what other courts did with similar
claims. In Smoak Chevrolet Co. v. Barton, 14 for example, the Navajo
appellate court considered whether provisions for acceleration of
installment payments were "charges" that needed to be disclosed on the face
of contracts for consumer goods under the federal Truth in Lending Act.21 5
The court held that while an acceleration clause that simply accelerated the
rate of payment need not be disclosed, one that provided the seller with an
unearned benefit by allowing the seller to keep unearned interest or other
211. The number before the slash includes only cases between Navajos and non-Navajos;
the number after the slash includes both cases between Navajos and non-Navajos and those
between Hopis and non-Indians.
212. Again, the number before the slash includes only cases of Navajos opposing non-
Navajos; the number after the slash includes cases in which Hopis sued non-Indian companies.
213. In interpreting federal statutes, the court takes a stance similar to that of state or
federal court. It accepts decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding federal laws as binding,
but accepts lower court decisions only as guidance, and considers itself to have the same power
to interpret such laws as would a state or lower federal court. See Manygoats v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 4 Navajo Rptr. 94, 96-97 (1983). With respect to state law, the court relies
on state courts to determine the proper interpretation of state statutes, but in the absence of such
interpretations makes its own attempt to determine the intent of the legislature. See Gen.
Electric Credit Corp. v. Becenti, 4 Navajo Rptr. 34, 34-36 (1983).
214. 1 Navajo Rptr. 153 (1977).
215. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638-1639 (2000).
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finance charges was the equivalent of a charge, and therefore required
disclosure.216
In so holding, the court declined to follow decisions by the Third, Fifth,
and Tenth Circuits that such provisions need not be disclosed. While at first
glance this result might seem to suggest a less favorable climate for non-
Indian businessmen, further examination counters this suggestion. First, the
Third Circuit in its decision relied on a state statute providing that unearned
finance charges and interest could never be retained in the face of
acceleration, so that sellers could never obtain the unearned benefit that the
Navajo court required the seller to disclose.1 7 Second, the Fifth Circuit
subsequently met en banc and reversed its prior decision, reaching
essentially the same decision as the Navajo court had.21 8 The Ninth Circuit
subsequently reached a more radical position than the Navajo Court, (one
previously adopted by several district courts) holding that acceleration
clauses must always be disclosed to inform the consumer of their effect on
unearned finance charges.2 9 Finally, the Federal Reserve Board, the agency
charged with administering the Truth in Lending Act, itself interpreted the
Act as the Navajo Nation had, an interpretation implicitly adopted by the
U.S. Supreme Court when it overruled the Ninth Circuit. 220 Thus the Navajo
Nation, rather than adopting an unusually pro-consumer stance, instead
struck a middle ground ultimately consistent with the holdings of the
majority of circuits as well as the administering agency.
In other cases, the Navajo courts reached positions more favorable to
businesses than those of surrounding courts. The Navajo Court of Appeals
held, for example, that counterclaims under the Truth in Lending Act were
barred by the Act's one-year statute of limitations, 21 although a slight
majority of state courts, including the New Mexico Supreme Court, had
reached the opposite conclusion.222 In 1980, Congress amended the statute
to permit such counterclaims after the expiration of the statute of
limitations; only then did the Navajo court reverse its prior position.223
216. Smoak Chevrolet Co., 1 Navajo Rptr. at 159.
217. Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1975).
218. McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 571 F.2d 948, 950-51 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc) (holding that an acceleration clause alone is not a charge but a provision permitting
retention of unearned interest charge requiring disclosure).
219. St. Germain v. Bank of Haw., 573 F.2d 572, 576-77 (9th Cir. 1977).
220. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 563 n.8, 569-70 (1980) (discussing
Federal Reserve Board interpretations).
221. Smoak Chevrolet Co., I Navajo Rptr. at 160-61.
222. A-I Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Becenti, 2 Navajo Rptr. 72, 75-77 (Navajo D. Ct. 1979).
223. Manygoats v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 4 Navajo Rptr. 94, 97-98 (1983)
(discussing Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 180, 7 U.S.C. § 615).
1087
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
And while very few of the businesses that find themselves before the
court are run by Navajos, the court appears very aware that an anti-business
climate will not serve the Navajo people. In one employment case, for
example, the court rejected an interpretation of the Navajo Preference in
Employment Act that would require companies to grant preference to
"potentially qualified" applicants, and thereby require the employer to delay
hiring until potentially qualified Navajo applicants had been given a
mandatory welding test."4 The court found that such a requirement would
discourage businesses from locating on the Navajo Nation, reduce
employment opportunities, and thereby defeat the ultimate intent of the
law.225 In another case, the court upheld the Navajo Nation's claim of
sovereign immunity, but encouraged the Navajo Nation Council to waive
sovereign immunity in its contracts to encourage economic development on
the Navajo Nation. 26 In developing its judicial system, the Navajo Nation
seeks both to protect Navajo individuals and to encourage non-Indian
business to invest and participate in economic development. The court
appears to be aware that the best way to accomplish both goals is to provide
a forum that merits the trust of all parties.
3. Child Custody Cases
Another area in which one might fear bias is in cases involving child
custody. The Navajo Nation, like many Indian nations, sees maintaining a
connection with Navajo children as necessary to safeguard its future. The
Navajo Nation Court has declared that "[t]he most precious resource of the
Navajo Nation is indeed its children," and interprets the Navajo Nation
Children's Code as designed "to protect this vital resource of the Navajo
Nation. 2 27 It would not be surprising if this concern resulted in a bias
against non-Navajo parents when they seek custody of children born in
relationships with Navajos, or in favor of the jurisdiction of Navajo courts
over custody determinations.
The federal Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") 228 provides the Navajo
courts with broad, controversial jurisdiction over certain custody disputes.
224. Largo v. Gregory & Cook, Inc., 7 Navajo Rptr. I 11, 116-17 (1995).
225. Id. at 114-15.
226. TBI Contractors, Inc. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 6 Navajo Rptr. 57, 59-62 (1988).
227. In re A.O., 5 Navajo Rptr. 121, 124 (Navajo D. Ct. 1987); see also In re Custody of
S.R.T., 6 Navajo Rptr. 407, 411 (1991) ("There is no resource more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of the Navajo Nation than our children. Consequently, we have a special
duty to ensure their protection and well-being.").
228. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1931 (2000).
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Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to address the startling and
disproportionate rates at which Indian children were being removed from
their homes and placed with non-Indian families. 29 One of the central
means through which the Act tried to curb this trend was to increase tribal
court jurisdiction over custody decisions230 involving Indian children. 23' The
Act provides tribes with exclusive jurisdiction over such cases where the
children are domiciled on reservations or are wards of the tribal court, and
presumptive jurisdiction where the children are domiciled off reservation.232
Concern that tribal courts given jurisdiction will favor tribal retention of
Indian children over the children's best interests or the rights of the parent
involved appears to motivate much ICWA litigation in state courts.
23 3
The Navajo Nation has one of the most active Indian Child Welfare
offices in the country and in the 1980s obtained a landmark decision from
the Utah Supreme Court affirming its jurisdiction over a Navajo child that
had lived since he was three with a non-Indian adoptive family.234 Its
aggressive enforcement of the Act surely brings children with connections
to non-Indian guardians and relatives into the Navajo courts. Despite this,
not one of the 534 Navajo appellate cases online arises under ICWA.235 This
alone suggests that when the Navajo Nation trial courts exercise jurisdiction
in custody cases involving nonmembers, parties do not perceive the results
as stark violations of the law.
2 36
229. See id. § 1901(4).
230. The definition of child custody cases excludes both those arising from disputes
between parents and those arising from criminal acts by minors. Id. § 1903(1).
231. An "Indian child" is one that is either an enrolled member of a federally recognized
tribe, or a biological child of an enrolled member who is herself eligible for enrollment in the
tribe. Id. § 1903(4).
232. Id. § 1911(a)-(b). Under section 1911(b), even where a case arises in state court, the
court must notify the relevant tribe, and, upon a request by the tribe or the child's parent or
guardian, must transfer the case to tribal court absence an objection by one of the child's parents
or "good cause" to the contrary.
233. For a thoughtful discussion of this concern, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints
Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance,
51 EMORY L.J. 587, 624-67 (2002).
234. In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986). The U.S. Supreme Court
quoted extensively from the Halloway case in reaching the same holding. Miss. Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52-54 (1989).
235. Four cases, including three district court cases, mention the Act, but only to use its
findings as guidance or to say that the cases are not brought under the Act. While none of the
district court cases online arise under the Act either, given the limited publishing of district
court decisions one should not draw significant conclusions from this statistic.
236. It should be remembered that ICWA cases do not include cases in which parents are
fighting over custody of a child, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (2000), and so exclude many of the most
bitter custody disputes.
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Additional evidence comes from the custody cases the appellate courts
have decided. Custody disputes arising between parents are not governed by
ICWA, and the Navajo courts have decided several of these. Of the six
online appellate decisions involving custody of children of both Navajo and
non-Navajo parents, non-Navajos won four. The earliest of these is In re
Chewiwi,237 a 1977 case concerning custody of the daughter of an Isleta
Pueblo man and a Navajo woman. 238 During their marriage, the couple lived
on the Isleta Pueblo, and enrolled their daughter, Catherine Chewiwi, with
the Pueblo.239 When Catherine was five, both her parents were killed in an
auto accident and the Isleta Pueblo court appointed her paternal uncle, a
member of the Pueblo, as her guardian.240 A few months later, while
Catherine was visiting her Navajo maternal relatives on the Navajo Nation,
they filed a petition for guardianship with the Navajo courts. 24 ' The trial
court granted them temporary guardianship, and the Chewiwis appealed. 24
2
The Navajo Court of Appeals vacated the order.243 The court held that
although it had jurisdiction over any Navajo child properly on the
reservation, and the child was on the reservation with the consent of her
legal guardian, "[t]he mere fact that the child visited relatives within the
Navajo Nation cannot by itself confer on a Navajo court the subject matter
jurisdiction to determine this child's status." 24 As to the Isleta Pueblo order,
the court held that although the Navajo Nation was not a party to the U.S.
Constitution, and therefore not bound to grant full faith and credit to foreign
orders, the order would be recognized as a matter of comity.245
Subsequent decisions also recognize the rights of non-Navajo relatives in
child custody disputes. In 1982, in Lente v. Notah,246 the court vacated a
district court order granting a Navajo father custody of his child with a
Comanche woman. 247 Although the parents had agreed to a divorce decree
stipulating that Ms. Lente would have custody, two years later Mr. Notah
filed for custody claiming that she had given him the child saying she did
not want her anymore.248 The trial court granted temporary custody without
237. 1 Navajo Rptr. 120 (1977).
238. Id. at 120.
239. Id. at 124.
240. Id. at 120-21.
241. Id. at 121.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 124.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 126.
246. 3 Navajo Rptr. 72 (1982).
247. Id. at 81.
248. ld. at 72.
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granting the mother proper notice, an order the court found denied her
"basic rights guaranteed by the Navajo Bill of Rights and common
sense." 49 Although Ms. Lente had later been given notice and participated
in the hearings leading to the final custody order, she had preserved her
right to object to jurisdiction and the appellate court held that the
subsequent hearings were not enough to cure the initial improper order.
The appellate court vacated the order, but held that because the child likely
formed psychological bonds with her father in the four years she had lived
with him, she should not be removed while the trial court considered the
matter.251' The court ordered that upon rehearing the lower court should
obtain expert evaluations of the best interests of the child, and listed thirty-
four factors it should consider in making its decision.2
The next case, Yazzie v. Yazzie 21 concerned an action filed by a Navajo
father for divorce of his Comanche wife and custody of his four children. At
the time of the filing, his wife and their children had not resided on the
reservation for some time. 4 After initially filing a motion challenging
jurisdiction, the mother did not further participate in the proceedings. 5 The
judge, therefore, granted the divorce and decided as to the division of
property and custody of the children by default.2 56 The appellate court
reversed. It held that while the trial court had jurisdiction over the marriage
as the father resided on the Navajo Nation, it did not have custody over the
children or property off the reservation7 While affirming the divorce, the
court vacated the remainder of the order for lack of jurisdiction.258
249. Id. at 75.
250. Id. at 74.
251. Id. at 77-78 (stating that custody would be granted only until an investigation was
completed).
252. Id. at 78-79. While the mother argued that the Navajo custom of matrilocality should
determine the case in her favor, the court held that this was a decision for the trial court, which
had the power to determine whether it was appropriate to follow common law under the
circumstances. Id. at 81. In In re Chewiwi, the court had recognized an order placing a child
with her non-Navajo paternal relatives, an order that would go against this customary tradition.
I Navajo Rptr. 120, 127 (1977). Common law, however, does not appear to have been raised in
that case. In a subsequent custody dispute between Navajo parents, the court held that following
the common law presumption of custody in favor of the mother would violate the Navajo Equal
Rights Amendment. Help v. Silvers, 4 Navajo Rptr. 46, 48 (1983).
253. 5 Navajo Rptr. 66 (1985).
254. Id. at 67.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 70-71.
258. Id.
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The court has also made substantive custody determinations that favored
non-Navajo parents. In Pavenyouma v. Goldtooth,259 the lower court found
both the Hopi mother and Navajo father to be suitable parents,260 but after
the parents could not agree on a plan for joint custody of their five children
ordered that the mother would have custody of two of the children and the
father would have custody of the other three.26' The appeals court reversed,
finding that while it was preferable for parents to agree on arrangements for
joint custody, it was the obligation of the court to step in if they could not.262
The court ordered that the mother would have custody of all children during
the school year, while the father would have custody during the summer,
and ordered the father to pay child support while the children were with
their mother.263
The one case that seems troubling from a fairness perspective is In re
Custody of S.R.T.,2 64 in which the court upheld a default order granting a
Navajo mother custody over her child against the claims of a non-Indian
who claimed to be the father. Although the child was an enrolled member of
the Navajo Nation, he was living in Texas with the sister of the alleged
father at the time the petition for custody was filed.265 The non-Indian father
had received notice of the petition and had retained local counsel before the
hearing.2 66 Neither the father nor his attorney, however, showed up for the
hearing. 267 The attorney had mailed a motion for continuance to the court on
the day before the hearing, and it was not received until the day after the
hearing.268 On appeal, the court found that the father had proper notice of
the hearing and no excuse for failing to appear.2
69
Despite this, the Navajo Supreme Court did examine the limited
evidence of paternity presented on appeal. The mother's name alone was on
the birth certificate, the child had the mother's last name, and the couple
had only lived together briefly before the appellant began living with
another woman.27 The only written evidence of any family relation with the
appellant was a letter authorizing his sister to consent to medical care for
259. 5 Navajo Rptr. 17 (1984).
260. Goldtooth v. Goldtooth, 3 Navajo Rptr. 223, 224 (Navajo D. Ct. 1982).
261. Pavenyouma, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 17.
262. Id. at 18-19.
263. Id. at 20-21.
264. 6 Navajo Rptr. 407 (1991).
265. Id. at 407.
266. Id. at 408.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 412.
270. Id. at 410.
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the child, and the court found this was not enough to establish paternity.71
As to jurisdiction, the court found that as the child was born out of wedlock,
because the father had made no efforts to establish paternity, the child's
domicile for jurisdictional purposes was the same as that of his mother.272
While the jurisdictional decision seems unfair to the off-reservation father,
the principle that domicile of an illegitimate child is that of his mother
regardless of his physical location of the child derives from Anglo-
American law.273
The appellate court has decided one additional custody case, In re
A. 0.,274 in a way unfavorable to a non-Navajo parent, but this was an
intermediate decision. In the case, the court reversed a lower court's
dismissal of a petition for custody and remanded for more facts as to
jurisdiction.275 On remand, the district court affirmed the denial of
jurisdiction. 76 The child in A.O. had been made the ward of the court based
on a petition alleging abuse,277 a fact that would ordinarily grant the court
jurisdiction. The district court found, however, that the order of wardship
was based on a fraud on the court, as the petitioners had not notified the
court that there was a pending New Mexico court custody case.2 78 Under
these facts, the court ceded to the concurrent jurisdiction of the New
Mexico courts. 27 9 Two other district court cases involving non-Navajo
parents have also been published, and both reveal the same reluctance to
accept questionable jurisdiction.28 °
271. Id.
272. ld. at 409-11.
273. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this as a principle of federal common law in Miss.
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 53 (1989), holding that illegitimate children
were domiciled on the reservation where the mother lived although they had never been there.
See also In re Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187, 191-92 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Domicil § 41 (2004).
274. 5 Navajo Rptr. 121 (1987).
275. Id. at 123-24.
276. In re A.O., 5 Navajo Rptr. 285, 291-92 (Navajo D. Ct. 1987).
277. Id. at 287-88.
278. Id. at 290-91.
279. Id. at 291.
280. In re Custody of B.N.P., 4 Navajo Rptr. 155 (Navajo D. Ct. 1983), for example,
involved a custody dispute between a Mescalero Apache mother and a Navajo father. The
couple obtained a divorce decree in Mescalero Apache court, and originally stipulated to
custody in the father. Id. at 155. Two years later, however, while the children were on the
Mescalero Apache reservation visiting their mother, the mother returned to the Mescalero court
and, under the pretext of the presence of the children, had the decree modified. Id. Some months
later, when the children were visiting the father, he went to the Navajo Nation court for custody
using the same pretext. Id. The court recognized the delicacy of the dispute, stating:
[Tihis court is called upon to make a decision on which of the two Indian
governments should exercise the power and duty to protect children under
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In sum, therefore, even in the vital issue of custody of children with
Navajo heritage, the court appears to have been equitable to non-Navajo
parents and not to have asserted a broad jurisdiction that would deprive
parents of their rights.
D. Conclusion and Comparison with Other Tribal Courts
The data regarding the experience of nonmembers in the Navajo courts
do not support the assumption of the United States Supreme Court that
nonmembers will be at a disadvantage in tribal courts. Nonmembers win
just under half of the time they appear before the courts, and the decisions
reveal few troubling assessments of law or fact. Instead, the court often
establishes precedent or urges the legislature to amend tribal statutes to
address perceived inequities. This is true even in cases involving matters
that would seem particularly vulnerable to bias.
A less comprehensive review of decisions by other tribal court systems
suggests a similar phenomenon there.281 The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal
Court of Connecticut, for example, hears numerous cases involving
nonmembers arising from its massive gaming industry. In these cases, it has
expanded the legal remedies for non-Indian employees, by finding a
property right in continued employment and invalidating the procedures for
their care. The foremost consideration for this court must be the best interests
of the children who come before it, and after that considerations of
governmental relations come into play.
Id. It declared that it was uncomfortable with the parental kidnapping on both sides but declined
to recognize the modified Mescalero Apache decree as jurisdiction was fraudulently obtained.
Id. at 155-56. Deciding the case on the merits, the court held that because the children had
always lived on the Navajo Nation, and said they were afraid to live with the mother because of
her drinking, the court ordered custody in the father with reasonable visitation in the mother, Id.
at 157-58. In In re Adoption of S.C.M., 4 Navajo Rptr. 167 (Navajo D. Ct, 1983), the court
denied a Navajo uncle of a Canadian Indian child the right to an adoption and temporary
custody order. Although the parents had signed consent to adoption in Canada, it was not clear
why the adoption had not been pursued in Canadian court, or that the Navajo Nation courts even
had jurisdiction over the child under the applicable rules of domicile and personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 168-72. Nor could the uncle have the investigation for adoption waived, although a
Canadian report appeared to be attached to the affidavits of consent. Id. at 172. Instead, the
uncle was required to prove that the Navajo Nation court, and not the Canadian courts, was the
appropriate forum. Id. at 173-74.
281. Few courts publish as wide a variety of cases as does the Navajo Nation. Even where
decisions are available online, a search for cases including the terms "nonmember" or "non-
Indian" generally produces only those cases concerned primarily with jurisdiction, and not the
many cases in which nonmembers are before tribal courts in which jurisdiction is not the issue.
To capture these cases, one would need to skim all the cases to determine the status of the
parties.
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administrative hearings on dismissal as violating due process, 212 and
subsequently inferring a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity for ICRA
challenges by non-Indian employees.283 The Mohegan Tribal Gaming Court
of Appeals similarly has found an implied property right in employment by
employees of its gaming facilities, and ordered a rehearing for a non-Indian
employee who had been dismissed on charges of drug dealing after finding
that the evidence at the previous administrative hearing did not satisfy due
process standards.284 In the custody context, the Delaware Court of Indian
Offenses ordered visitation rights for the Kiowa grandmother of her
grandchildren against the wishes of the children's Delaware mother.285
Mark Rosen, in a broader study of tribal court decisions concerning the
Indian Civil Rights Act,286 evaluated the ten decisions within his sample
involving nonmembers.287 Of the ten decisions, he found that eight showed
"responsible and good faith interpretation of ICRA," and that none of the
ten involved "patently outrageous reasoning or outcomes., 288 He found that
one case, which concerned the jurisdiction of the tribal court, resulted in a
fair outcome, but perhaps "activist" reasoning in finding jurisdiction. 28 9 The
final case he found resulted in an arguably harsh outcome for parties
challenging a possessory interest tax, one of whom was an outsider.29 0 He
found that the result was the product of "Stock Incorporation" of federal
law providing that the law prohibits equal protection challenges based on
residence, 291 but he wondered whether the adoption of an essentially
toothless standard was encouraged by the fact that one of the parties was a
nonmember.292 Within the limits of the sample, however, Rosen concluded,
"there is no indication that tribal courts have succumbed to the temptation
to favor the insider at the expense of outsiders. 293
282. Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 1 Mash. Pequot R. 15 (1996).
283. Healy v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., I Mash. Pequot R. 63 (1999).
284. Pineiro v. Office of the Dir. of Regulation, No. GDTC-T-99-102, 1999 NAMG
0000001, U 18-28 (Mohegan Oct. 14, 1999) (VersusLaw).
285. In re C.D.S., I Okla. Trib. 200, 207 (W. Del. Ct. Indian Offenses 1988).
286. Rosen, supra note 8. Rosen's study was based on decisions published in the Indian
Law Reporter between 1986 and 1998. Id. at 510. The Indian Law Reporter publishes in hard
copy selected decisions submitted to it by about twenty-five tribal courts. Id.
287. Id. at 573-78.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 576. As I argue below, such insistence on jurisdiction of the court is clear in the
Navajo decisions as well, and may in fact be tied to a broader sense of the importance of the
judicial role that leads the courts to resist temptations to favor insiders and engage instead in
good faith judging.
290. Id. at 576-77.
291. Id. at 577.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 578.
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The U.S. Civil Rights Commission also conducted a study, collecting
information over several years and including testimony from numerous
witnesses in several states, to investigate tribal court implementation of the
ICRA.2 9 4 Although the report did not specifically discuss judicial treatment
of nonmembers, the Commission was created during the Reagan
administration in part to address concerns of non-Indian businessmen, and
was directed to consider the Duro Fix affirming criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians, which had been passed as a temporary measure in
1990 and was due to expire in a few months.2 95 The Commission found that
while there were problems in tribal courts, they were primarily due to
insufficient funds and the problems of any new court system in establishing
its role and the scope of its authority.296 Significantly, the Commission
supported permanent legislation ensuring tribal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians, 297 and expressed its "hopes that the current trend
towards the narrowing of tribal jurisdiction will be reversed. 298
The Commission also discussed one interesting case that nominally
involved a nonmember. The case concerned an applicant who had been
denied enrollment in the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah-Ouray
Reservation.29 9 The tribal court reversed the denial of enrollment, finding
that the applicant was eligible for enrollment under the tribal constitution. 0
In response, the tribal legislature acted to strip the tribal court of its
jurisdiction to review enrollment decisions. 30 1 The court, however, refused
to accept this change, holding that until the legislature created another
"impartial forum" to hear cases claiming violation of the ICRA, it
necessarily had such jurisdiction.3 2 This case as well as unreported cases
discussed by the Commission,3 3 reveal the same pattern shown by the
Navajo courts of ruling in accordance with their understandings of the law
and the need for an impartial forum to hear disputes, even in the face of
resistance by other parts of the tribal government.
Even supplemented by these examples from other tribal courts, my
review of Navajo decisions has limitations. There may well be rogue tribal
294. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1991).
295. Id. at 68-70.
296. See id. at 29-57.
297. Id. at 73.
298. Id. at 74.
299. Chapoose v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation, 13 Ind. L. Rep. 6023
(Ute Tribal Ct. 1986).
300. Id. at 6024.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 6025.
303. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 51-63 (1991).
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courts, just as there are rogue state and local courts,3°4 who make decisions
in bad faith. But given the disproportionate size and population of the
Navajo Nation and the fact that more than most tribal courts it has the
characteristics particularly troubling to the U.S. Supreme Court, data
regarding the Navajo courts are of particular relevance.
The relative fairness of the courts, however, does not speak to the second
assumption of the Supreme Court, that adjudication of outsider rights has
little to do with "self-government," or the legal and governmental integrity
of tribes. The following sections of the Article will discuss the particular
historical position of tribal legal justice systems, additional statistics
regarding nonmembers in the Navajo courts, and theoretical insights
regarding the role of formal legal institutions to challenge this assumption.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE OUTSIDER IN TRIBAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
The recent United States Supreme Court cases regarding jurisdiction
over nonmembers are colored by the assumption that the most important
work of justice lies in adjudicating disputes among those that are formally
enrolled in the community and that concern matters traditionally of unique
importance to the tribe. This assumption accords well with much political
theory, which tends to begin with an imagined community with fixed
boundaries and has less often grappled with questions of how community
boundaries are drawn and the obligations caused by varying levels of
community membership. While there are, of course, exceptions, 3°5 for much
political and legal theory, the outsider is an exceptional case, troubling the
polity and its rules for distribution of goods and rights but not meaningfully
contributing to its development.3 °6 This section of the Article builds on
theoretical work regarding the development of law to argue that, in fact, the
outsider is a particularly important figure in the development of formal legal
304. For a catalogue of incidents of bad faith judging in non-tribal courts, see Geoffrey P.
Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEx. L. REV. 431, 432-456 (2004).
305. For a broad-based political theory that has always incorporated questions of
membership, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31-63 (1983). Feminist theory has
also long questioned assumptions that citizenship is a straightforward category of belonging.
See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 7-11 (1990) (drawing
from feminist and critical race theory to develop a theory questioning categories of inclusion).
The increasing mobility of people, jobs, and culture has also generated a wealth of literature on
the different kinds of membership in our polities. See, e.g., Rogers Brubaker, Immigration,
Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES 131-53
(Gershon Shafir ed., 1998); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, in THE CITIZENSHIP
DEBATES, supra at 167-85; Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Toward a Postnational Model of
Membership, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES, supra at 189-211.
306. See BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 2-3 (2001).
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systems. It then draws on my research and the research of other scholars to
suggest that this is particularly true for contemporary Indian tribes.
Much of formal law everywhere is the product of conflict,3 °7 a means to
address disputes to which existing norms and relationships do not provide a
resolution. Where informal controls, whether the pressure of clan relatives
or internalized moral or religious norms, are sufficient to regulate individual
behavior, there is little need for formal legal institutions.30 8 This is not
possible where a community includes diverse groups that do not share
common norms or relationships 30 9 or where external factors create situations
for which community norms do not present a clear solution.310 At this point,
formal legal institutions must step in to draw on their institutional
legitimacy to resolve disputes in a way that will be respected by the
community of which they are part. Thus, despite the assumptions of both
opponents and some advocates of tribal jurisdiction, in some ways it is
precisely to address the conflicts involving outsiders and, more broadly,
changes brought about by outside influences that formal legal institutions
exist.
Evidence regarding other tribal court systems supports this thesis. As
discussed above, Rennard Strickland discovered in studying the Cherokee
legal system of the 1820s and 1830s that courts disproportionately handled
cases involving intermarried white men and economic and social disputes
arising from contact with Anglo culture, while disputes exclusively between
Cherokees arising from familiar tribal activities could more frequently be
resolved without resort to the courts.3 ' Similarly, a study of the Indian
police forces in the late nineteenth century suggests that much of their work
involved controlling non-Indians trespassing on Indian lands and game.31 2
The experience of diverse modem tribal courts conforms to this pattern.
The courts of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe of Connecticut had to develop
rapidly to handle the various disputes arising from its operation of one of
the largest casinos in the United States.3 3 The vast majority of reported
307. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 151, at 148 ("Formal law presupposes [a] climate of
conflict").
308. Id. at 144-45.
309. See Engel, supra note 151, at 23-24.
310. FRIEDMAN, supra note 151, at 145.
311. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO
COURT 75 (1975).
312. See WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS IN
ACCULTURATION AND CONTROL 52-54 (1966).
313. The tribe had virtually no structures of governance left when it received federal
recognition as a tribe in 1983. See generally Hilary Waldman, New Life for a Forgotten People,
HARTFORD COURANT, May 22, 1994. In 1992, however, the tribe opened a casino under the
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cases from the Mashantucket Pequot courts concern nonmembers of the
tribe. 314 Through these cases, however, the court is creating traditions of
judicial review and grappling with legislative enactments in ways that
enhance its development as an institution. 315
One can also find examples of the influence of interactions with
outsiders on the courts of far more traditional tribes. The Alaska Native
Village of Klukwan, for example, created a formal legal system specifically
to consider whether a non-Indian's acquisition of rain screens from an
individual village member was permitted given the status of the rain screens
within the village's customary property system.316 The process of translating
village ideas of property in these sacred objects became a source of
reunification of the village and revitalization of its traditions." 7 Similarly,
one of the most significant recent cases before the Hopi Appellate Courts
concerns a conflict over the application of customary property rights
between a woman that had left the reservation and her nieces that remained
behind and cared for their grandmothers' land in the traditional way.318
Anthropologist Larry Nesper has documented an alternative way in
which interaction with outsiders is an important spur to tribal court
development. 39 He studies the way in which the Lac de Flambeau Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians developed a formal legal system in
response to their success in preserving off-reservation hunting and fishing
rights, and the threat that the state would regulate the exercise of these
rights if there were no tribal institutions to do so.32° Nepser argues that as an
institution which "resides culturally and socially on the border between
Indian and non-Indian society," the resulting court is "an important site for
auspices of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and was quickly faced with the need to
adjudicate disputes involving its thousands of employees and customers.
314. The decisions of the court are available at http://www.versuslaw.com.
315. See, e.g., Healy v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., I Mash. Pequot R. 63 (1999)
(establishing judicial review); Husband v. Wife, No. MPCA-2001-1065, 2003 NAMP 0000002,
32 (Mashantucket Pequot Jan. 24, 2003) (VersusLaw) (establishing principles of comity in
domestic relations cases).
316. The Village had originally petitioned the federal court to enforce a tribal ordinance
prohibiting the removal of the screens. The federal court declared that there was no federal
jurisdiction to enforce this claim and the case was remanded to the tribal court. Chilkat Indian
Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989). The village was forced to create a tribal
court system in order to resolve this dispute.
317. Discussions with and presentations by Willa Jean Perlmutter, Attorney for the Village
in Native Village of Klukwan v. Johnson, in Hartford, Conn. (Apr. 2003).
318. Smith v. James, No. 98AP00001 1, 1999 NAHT 0000012, 14-15 (Hopi Nov. 16,
1999) (VersusLaw).
319. Nesper, supra note 8.
320. Id.
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the reproduction and transformation of community values and practices. 32'
While distinctly ambivalent about the results of this process, Nesper
documents ways in which testimony from community members troubles
notions of rigid distinctions between members and nonmembers and formal
and traditional authority.
322
My research regarding the Navajo Nation provides more evidence of the
importance of nonmembers in tribal legal systems. As discussed in Part III,
the Navajo Nation has a high degree of insularity relative to most Indian
tribes. Culturally, demographically, and geographically, it is one of the
tribes that most closely matches the archetype of the homogenous and
traditional tribe. Despite this, 22.8% of the decisions issued by the Navajo
Nation appellate court over the last thirty-five years have involved non-
Navajo litigants.323 This figure has little to do with the numbers of non-
Navajos residing on the Navajo reservation. This is evident in the fact that
although non-Navajo Indians compose about 6.5% of the reservation
population and non-Indians compose only 3.5%, 91.8% of the cases
involving outsiders, or 20.9% of the total cases decided by the Navajo
appellate courts, involve non-Indians. Cases involving non-Navajo Indians,
on the other hand, compose only 1.8% of all decisions.324
Table III: Percentage of Cases Involving Nonmembers
1969- 1974- 1979- 1984- 1989- 1994- 1999- Total
74 79 84 89 94 99 2004
Total cases 4 12 33 17 17 18 21 122
involving
nonmembers
Total cases in 21 72 186 57 79 59 60 534
period
Percent of cases 19% 16.7% 17.7% 29.8% 21.5% 30.5% 35% 22.8%
involving
nonmembers
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. This figure would likely not be replicated in trial court filings, as a majority of cases
filed in the courts are criminal, and tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
324. Interestingly, most of the non-Navajo Indian cases arise from family relations with
Navajos, such as custody and domestic violence, while relatively few of the non-Indian cases
do. This appears to confirm the assertion of advocates of the Duro Fix legislation, that
nonmember Indians often occupy a different role on reservations than do non-Indians, and are
more integrated in the social life of tribal communities. See Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup
Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over Nonmember Indians, 38 FED. B. NEWS
& J. 70 (1991).
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If one looks at cases over only the last ten years, the figures become even
more striking. Since 1994, non-Navajos have been parties in 32.7% of the
cases decided by the Navajo Supreme Court. It is not clear that this figure
represents an increase in the number of cases involving nonmembers, as
during the same period the court stopped publishing opinions decided on a
summary basis,325 which might increase the percentage simply by reducing
the number of cases for which identification of the parties is not possible or
filter out cases that do not raise novel questions of law. It does indicate,
however, that over the last ten years almost one in three of the cases
significant enough to require a publishable opinion have involved non-
Indians.
These statistics are a reflection of the reality of Navajo life. Even on the
Navajo Nation, the tribal community that looks most, in some ways, like an
independent state, neither the tribe nor the people are isolated from outside
influences. This interaction is reflected even in the clan system that is
perhaps the most central aspect of Navajo culture.326 Each Navajo child is
"born to" his mother's clan and "born for" his father's clan, and these clan
memberships are a crucial part of one's identity, dictate who one may
appropriately marry, and form family bonds even among relative strangers
that entitle clan members to call on each other for support and assistance.
3 27
The Navajo clans include the Nakai or Mexican clan, and other clans named
after the Utes, the Zunis, and the Flat Foot Paiutes, each named after
members of these different peoples that incorporated with and became
important parts of the Navajo social structure. 328 These clans provide
evidence of the long history of non-Navajos becoming integral elements of
Navajo life.
325. The cases omitted include, for example, appeals dismissed for failure to timely file or
dismissed according to a stipulation of the parties. They also include several cases that would
otherwise have added to the proportion of cases involving nonmembers before the court, such as
decisions formally admitting attorneys to the Navajo bar, as well as a case I filed on my own
behalf, successfully challenging the Crownpoint District Court's power to appoint me to
represent parties outside my judicial district.
326. See Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV.
175, 182-84 (1994) [hereinafter Yazzie, Life Comes From It] (discussing significance of
clanship system in traditional Navajo law).
327. Id. at 182-83 & n.41.
328. C.E. Vandever, Report of Navajo Agency (Aug. 22, 1890), in ROBERT A. ROESSEL,
JR., PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE NAvAJO FROM 1860 TO 1910, at 146-47 (1980); see also Means
v. Dist. Court of the Chinle Judicial Dist., 7 Navajo Rptr. 382 (1999) (listing clans); In re
Marriage of Garcia, 5 Navajo Rptr. 30, 30-31 (1985) (discussing contributions of intermarried
Mexicans).
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The Navajo people have incorporated elements borrowed from
Europeans and Americans deep within their culture in other areas as well.32 9
The result is not a watered down culture, but instead one that is still
uniquely Navajo and that has enabled the Navajo Nation to survive and
even thrive. For example, although Spanish settlers originally introduced
sheep to Navajo agriculture, sheep have become an essential part of Navajo
society.33 ° The federal program of stock reduction in the early part of this
century was a flashpoint for anger at federal interference with Navajo
culture.33' While today overgrazing prohibits most people from making a
living entirely off sheep herding, many Navajos keep some sheep to
supplement their income,332 mutton is part of a traditional Navajo meal,333
and sheep wool is necessary for the woven rugs for which Navajos are
famous. Ownership and care of the sheep herd are deeply integrated in
Navajo understandings of the world. Sheep are used, for example, to teach
children values of responsibility and survival, and patterns of inheritance
and division of sheep reflect and shape Navajo ideas of property and
descent.334 One of the required portions of the annual Miss Navajo Nation
contest (which, in contrast to non-Indian beauty contests, does not include a
bathing suit contest and emphasizes academic and cultural accomplishment)
includes sheep butchering.335 These and other fusions of culture have
329. In the words of former Chief Justice Tom Tso, "Navajos are ... [a] flexible and
adaptable people. We find there are many things which we can incorporate into our lives that do
not change our concept of ourselves as Navajo." Tso, The Process of Decision Making, supra
note 134, at 227.
330. See JOHN J. WOOD ET AL., "SHEEP IS LIFE": AN ASSESSMENT OF LIVESTOCK REDUCTION
IN THE FORMER NAvAJO-HOPI JOINT USE AREA 25-26 (1982). While the 20 years between this
study and the present have probably reduced the percentage of Navajos involved in sheep
herding, my experience confirms that sheep remain an integral part of Navajo culture, even for
people that do not keep sheep themselves.
33 1. DONALD L. PARMAN, THE NAVAJOS AND THE NEW DEAL 65-66, 77 (1976).
332. WOOD ET AL., supra note 330, at 26 (noting that 36% of Navajos used sheep as a
source of income).
333. Id. (44% used livestock in ceremonies both as part of a meal for participants and in a
symbolic role). During my time in the Navajo Nation, holding a mutton feast was the common
way to raise money for a colleague hit by hard times, and the weekly mutton buffet was a well-
attended event at the Navajo Nation Inn.
334. Id. at 25-26. The importance of sheep keeping is also reflected in the bitter legal
disputes over grazing land.
335. See LeRoy DeJolie, Navajoland: A Trip to the Fair, IMAGES OF ARIZONA,
http://www.imagesofarizona.corndejolie/fair02.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). In one online
discussion regarding whether the tribe should take back the crown of a past Miss Navajo
Nation, who had later been convicted for participating in her boyfriend's drug business, a
participant said, "She had the talents and the skills not to mention that she did butcher the
sheep." Posting of Nah to Gathering, http://www.powwows.com/gathering/showthread.php?t=
6987&goto=nextoldest (Dec. 12, 2000, 11:15 EST).
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enhanced rather than diluted the distinctiveness and cohesion of Navajo
society.
3 6
This interaction continues today. As the above statistics suggest, a large
number of Navajo business relationships are with non-Indians. Many
Navajo people living on reservations have been educated, lived, or worked
in off-reservation communities. 337 Even when they live and work on the
reservation, Navajos will frequently interact with non-Navajos. Non-Indian
mining companies, such as Peabody Coal, and stores and customer service
industries, such as Basha's Supermarket and Cameron Trading Post, are
among the most significant on-reservation employers. Given the lack of
economic development on the Navajo Nation, moreover, most Navajos rely
on off-reservation businesses for their consumer needs. Navajo people and
those from other nearby reservations flood the off-reservation town of
Gallup, New Mexico on weekends, making its mammoth Super Wal-Mart
one of the most successful in the United States.
Similarly, although the tribe is very aware and proud of its sovereignty
and separateness from the United States, serving in the U.S. military is an
important and honored part of Navajo life.338 As on most reservations, a
procession of veterans carrying the U.S. flag is a solemn opening to public
celebrations and fairs. Again, military service does not represent only a
capitulation to Anglo culture, but a celebration of Navajo
accomplishments. 39 Navajo code-talkers, who played an important role in
World War II by using the Navajo language to form an unbreakable code,
are heroes not simply because of their military service, but because that
service valued the unique and formerly oppressed Navajo language.
The outside world influences ideas of law as well. As I know from
experience, if you ask a class of Navajo students about the Navajo Nation
Bill of Rights, you'll get blank looks; but ask them what the cops on TV say
when they arrest someone, and you'll get a chorus: "You have the right to
remain silent, if you choose to give up that right anything you say or do can
336. See WILLIAMS, supra note 181, at 2 ("The cultural history of the Navajo is replete with
references concerning the various cultural items and techniques borrowed and incorporated
from other people. Yet each of the historical and cultural accounts ... mentions the distinctive
character of Navajo culture through time, in spite of the influx of ideas from different cultures.")
(citations omitted).
337. See, e.g., ARIZONA COURT FORUM, STATE AND TRIBAL COURT INTERACTION: BUILDING
COOPERATION: AN ARIZONA PERSPECTIVE 29-30 (1991).
338. The role of veterans on the Navajo reservation is poignantly depicted in the film
WINDS OF CHANGE: A MATTER OF PROMISES (PBS 1990).
339. While many Indians voluntarily sign up for military service, the mandatory draft has
been objected to as a violation of sovereignty rights. See Ex parte Green, 123 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.
1941).
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be used against you in a court of law . . ,,140 And while the clan system
retains significant importance in Navajo life, it is no longer the primary
source of property or economic support. Property formerly descended
through the maternal clan and individuals depended on matrilineal relatives
for support in cases of divorce or death rather than on what Anglo society
calls the immediate family. Today, however, many Navajo people expect to
inherit from their spouses and expect an equitable division of property in
the event of divorce.34'
Mark Rosen's study of the ICRA decisions suggests that a similar
influence can be seen in judicial decisions.342 ICRA imposes most of the
provisions of the U.S. Bill of Rights on Indian tribes but ensures that tribes
are often the sole forum to review and enforce its guarantees.343 Although
tribal courts tailor ICRA guarantees to tribal traditions and circumstances,
they typically rely on federal decisions as guidance in this process, and even
when they do not cite federal decisions or law, their interpretations often
use federal constitutional terms, such as "due process," "fundamental
rights," or "equal protection," suggesting a deep integration of federal
understandings of these rights.344 Rosen notes that even in Navajo Nation
decisions that rely heavily on customary ways to interpret ICRA guarantees,
traditions are read through a lens colored by Anglo legal understandings.345
Thus, in interpreting the due process guarantee, the Navajo court held that
Navajo common law included the right to notice and a hearing because
traditional practices included resolving disputes by a collective decision at a
public gathering led by an elder statesman and attended by the
wrongdoer.3 46 As Rosen points out, the tradition might equally easily have
been interpreted to require collective decision-making by the public, or
arbitration by an elder statesman and argues that the constitutional right to
340. I learned this in speaking at Navajo schools about the law and trying to teach them to
use it in their lives between 1996 and 1999.
341. There are forty-six cases online discussing the effect of divorce on the parties'
property and sixty concerning child support, all departing from the traditional rules for divorce
and separation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 3 Navajo Rptr. 9 (1980) (Navajo courts may
award alimony in divorce); Shorty v. Shorty, 3 Navajo Rptr. 151 (1982) (equitable division of
property after divorce); Yazzie v. Yazzie, SC-CV-08-98, 2000 NANN 0000001, V 29-383
(Navajo Aug. 16, 2000) (VersusLaw) (considering whether a house is community or separate
property).
342. Rosen, supra note 8, at 526.
343. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2004); Rosen, supra note 8, at 486-88.
344. Rosen, supra note 8, at 486-88.
345. Id. at 525-27.
346. Id. (discussing Begay v. Navajo Nation, 6 Navajo Rptr. 20 (1988)).
1104 [Ariz. St. L.J.
37:1047] JURISDICTION IN TRIBAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
notice of a hearing influenced the court's interpretation of Navajo common
law.347
Mobility between on- and off-reservation communities has also shaped
the legal problems faced by the tribe. In the 1990s, for example, as the
influence of gangs and drugs was decreasing in urban centers, it was
increasing on the Navajo Nation as returning residents brought these things
back from the cities. The Navajo Nation is dotted with hundreds of open
uranium mines, leftovers from days when the BIA granted mining
companies almost unfettered access to Navajo lands. The extended families
that formerly supported Navajo children are often scattered by the need to
find work elsewhere and by partial adoption of the Anglo emphasis on the
nuclear family. Federal policies of removing children from their homes and
sending them to schools that sought to generate shame of Navajo culture
and language have created generations that lack either appropriate family
skills or education, and that are firmly grounded neither in Anglo nor
Navajo tradition. Exposure to Anglo ideas of "the good life" have also
created conflict within Navajo society regarding the extent to which Navajo
ideals should be pursued above the material goods valued by mainstream
society. European American culture, in other words, has importantly shaped
the legal and social issues facing the Navajo Nation and the range of
culturally acceptable solutions for resolving them.
A. Jurisdiction over Nonmembers and Institutional Legitimacy
Given this importance of outsiders to contemporary tribes, jurisdiction
over nonmembers becomes crucial in shoring up tribal legitimacy for two
reasons: first, so that tribal legal systems can address the everyday legal and
social problems of concern to Indian people; second, so that tribal legal
systems are perceived as respected legal institutions.
1. Jurisdiction over Nonmembers and Utility of Tribal Legal
Systems
Given the interrelationships between Navajo and non-Navajo society,
jurisdiction over nonmembers is crucial in preserving the practical utility of
tribal legal systems. Even on a reservation as large and homogenous as the
Navajo Nation, a large portion of the commercial actors are non-Indian.
Non-Indians are the employers, the insurers, and the merchants. They are
the building contractors and the mining companies. While the Navajo
347. Id. at 527.
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Nation, like other tribes, is actively pursuing economic development, given
the disparity in capital, experience, and education between Indian and non-
Indian people, this need to turn to non-Indian businesses is not likely to
change any time soon. Nor should tribes or their members be forced to rely
solely on tribal businesses in order to ensure tribal jurisdiction. This would
impair tribal economies, discourage cooperation between tribes, states, and
non-Indian businesses, and increase non-Indian concern that tribes unfairly
grant preference to their members. 8
Without jurisdiction over non-Indian businesses, however, tribes lose the
ability to pursue uniform economic policies on their reservations or protect
their members in their interactions with outsiders. The Court's decision in
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,349 which held that the tribe could not
impose a hotel tax on nonmembers at hotels located on fee land,35 provides
a good example of this. The decision did not undermine the taxing ability or
revenues of the Navajo Nation as greatly as it would for other Indian
nations, as the Nation is primarily composed of tribal and member owned
land. Despite this, Navajo hotel occupancy tax revenues dropped 43%, by
$502,717, between fiscal year 2000, before Atkinson, and fiscal year
2003. 35'
Atkinson's impact will be much more severe on most other reservations,
where much more land is in non-Indian hands, and where these lands are
the most significant sites of economic activity.352 Eliminating taxing and
other economic regulatory jurisdiction over these lands would deprive the
tribe of the ability to set taxes with sufficient uniformity to be meaningfully
enforced. Governments have enough trouble getting compliance with their
tax laws and overcoming the perception that evading taxes is common and
just. Imagine the multiplication of this difficulty if your neighbors had no
need to pay taxes simply because of who they were and who owned title to
their land. And while tribes seek to invest in infrastructure to create a
favorable climate for economic development, without taxing jurisdiction
348. While many tribes, including the Navajo Nation, granted preferences to tribally owned
businesses, and these preferences have the approval of the federal government, 25 U.S.C. §
450e(c) (2000), these preferences are only for qualified tribal businesses, and in practice, tribes
must often rely on the businesses of nonmembers.
349. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
350. Id. at 659.
351. See NAVAJO TAX COMM'N, FY 1998 THRU FY 2003 ACTUAL TAX REVENUES, FY 2004
PROJECTED REVENUES, http://www.navajotax.org/new-page-7.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005)
(reporting revenues collected).
352. Think, for example, of the impact of Atkinson on the Yakima Reservation discussed in
the Brendale case, in which no one lived on the portion of the reservation without significant
non-Indian ownership. See supra text accompanying notes 59-74.
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they cannot force businesses on fee land to contribute to the costs of this
infrastructure. In the words of Navajo Nation Chief Justice Robert Yazzie,
"[t]he fee land businesses, for all practical purposes, receive a free ride." 353
In addition, jurisdiction over nonmember businesses is crucial to protect
tribal members. Jurisdiction over contracts between tribal members and
nonmember businesses, whether those contracts are for employment or for
purchases of goods and services, seems firmly protected by Montana's
consensual relationship exception. Encouraged by the Court's recent cases,
however, non-Indian employers are increasingly challenging tribal exercises
of jurisdiction over them.354 Even if the consensual relationship exception
ensures jurisdiction where non-Indians employ tribal members, to the extent
that it denies similar jurisdiction over nonmembers, it will encourage
invidious distinctions by both nonmembers and tribes. Non-Indian
employers will have incentives to avoid hiring or entering into business
relationships with tribal members to avoid tribal jurisdiction. Tribes,
moreover, will be encouraged to see themselves as legislating only for the
protection of tribal members, as it is only they and not the broader
community of reservation residents for whom their laws can be enforced.
The absence of jurisdiction also undermines tribal efforts to address
crime on Indian reservations. Lack of jurisdiction encourages non-Indians
to perceive reservations as places to flaunt disdain for the law and hostility
to Indian people. Oliphant and Belgarde's actions-punching a tribal police
officer that tried to stop a brawl, engaging tribal police in a high speed
chase across the reservation rather than pull over-might be seen as
examples of this. Today, non-Indians engage in flagrant motor vehicle
violations on tribal lands, apparently relishing the perceived lack of
jurisdiction over them.355
353. Hearing, supra note 4, at 92 (written testimony of Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of the
Navajo Nation).
354. See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, 1130, 1134-35 (9th Cir.
1995) (successfully challenging tribal jurisdiction to strike down company anti-nepotism law);
Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98, 2000 NANN 0000003, 22, 37-38
(Navajo Jan. 14, 2000) (VersusLaw) (challenging tribal jurisdiction over action by terminated
employee).
355. Hearing, supra note 4, at 26-27 (testimony of Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of the
Navajo Nation). This perception is not necessarily accurate. Many tribes, including the Navajo
Nation, have cross-deputization agreements with their surrounding states, under which tribal
police have authority to stop and ticket non-Indians for traffic violations on behalf of the state.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3874 (discussing cross deputization of tribal police officers);
N.M. STAT § 29-1-11 (2005) (authorizing tribal and pueblo police officers and certain federal
officers to enforce state law as New Mexico peace officers); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 28.609(6)
(discussing requirements for tribal police officers to be deputized as state peace officers); State
v. Manypenny, 662 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing status of cross-deputized
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A more disturbing example comes from statistics regarding crime against
Indians, particularly against Indian women. The average annual rate of rape
is more than twice as high among Native women than it is for any other
ethnic groups,356 and one in three Native women will be raped in her
lifetime. 57 But while for other ethnic groups, most offenders are of the same
race as their victims, almost 90% of Indian women are attacked by an
offender of a different race.35 8 (In general, about 70% of Indian victims of
violent crime are attacked by an offender of a different race, again in sharp
contrast with the preponderance of intra-racial violent crimes among other
ethnic groups.)359 The federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute such
crimes that occur in Indian country, 360 but rarely does. The U.S. Attorney's
Office, by some estimates, declines to prosecute 50 to 85% of the cases that
are reported, and many of those it does accept are child sexual abuse
cases.
36 1
The lack of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians thus creates a significant
practical gap in law enforcement, which may help to create and perpetuate
the high rates of interracial violence in Indian country.362 It appears to
contribute to a loss of faith in the efficacy of law on the part of victims as
well. While sexual assault is significantly underreported across all ethnic
groups, Native women are even less likely to report such crimes.36 3 Given
the small chance that a successful prosecution will result, the choice not to
report is understandable. But it too contributes to the general failure of any
legal system to address violent crime on Indian reservations.
tribal officers); Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 02009 (2002); 27 Okl. Op. Att'y Gen. 66 (1997); 22
Okl. Op. Att'y Gen. 71 (1991); Wash. AGLO 1978 No. 18.
356. PERRY, supra note 116, at 5.
357. Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
121, 123 (2004).
358. PERRY, supra note 116, at9 & tbl.13.
359. Id. at 9 & tbl. 12.
360. In Indian country, the federal government has jurisdiction over all crimes committed
by a non-Indian against an Indian under the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(2000), and jurisdiction over Indians committing sixteen "major" crimes, including rape and
sexual assault, under the Major Crimes Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000). One significant problem
with the statistics regarding sexual assault of Indian women is that they do not reflect whether
attacks take place in Indian country or outside it, and so lack necessary guidance regarding the
jurisdictional regime that applies.
361. Deer, supra note 357, at 126.
362. Id. at 127-28.
363. Id. at 123.
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2. Jurisdiction over Nonmembers and Internal Legitimacy
Jurisdiction over outsiders is also integral to the internal legitimacy of
tribal legal systems and the extent to which tribal communities accept them
as valid institutions. This perceived legitimacy is of significant practical
importance to Indian communities, because it helps to dictate the extent to
which legal dictates will be complied with absent perfect surveillance or
application of force.36" Scholars have long realized that the most important
work of law occurs beyond the eyes of judges and police. As Karl
Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel observed in their study of the Cheyenne
legal system:
The success of any legal system depends upon its acceptance
by the people to whom it applies. Insofar as the system is an
integrated part of the web of social norms developed within a
society's culture . . . it will be accepted as a parcel of habit-
conduct patterns in the social heritage of the people .... Law-in-
action exists only because less stringent methods of control have
failed to hold all persons in line, or in harmony, on points of
moment.365
The more that law on the books or law in the courts diverges from
popular conceptions of justice, the less efficient it is in regulating human
behavior.366 Individuals will fail to follow the law except when directly
observed or coerced by representatives of the state. Few governments can
afford the cost of this constant surveillance, and even paid governmental
representatives will often diverge from the announced view of the law in
their duties.3 67 Equally important, the perceived tension between justice and
364. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 151, at 113-15 (discussing importance of legitimacy
generally); POMMERSHEIM, supra note 10, at 66-67 (discussing legitimacy with respect to tribal
legal systems).
365. K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 239 (1941). Even
new legal principles may have their greatest impact outside legal enforcement structures. A
recent book on the effect of the Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, found that while
new legal rights had a significant impact on the sixty people with disabilities interviewed for the
study, the impact was due to transformation of the self- perception of the interviewees and
voluntary compliance on the part of their employers and coworkers rather than formal legal
assertion or enforcement of rights. DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF
INCLUSION 4-13 (2003).
366. Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2005).
367. This process is apparent, for example, in the implementation of rape reforms of the
1970s and 1980s. While states have generally reformed their laws to remove requirements for
corroboration of the victims' testimony, use of force against the victim, and injury to the victim,
the laws have not appreciably increased rape convictions because prosecutors, judges, and juries
continue to rely on these factors in determining whether to prosecute or convict. See Julie
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the government leads to corruption and other rent-seeking behavior
detrimental to the community as a whole.
3 68
This kind of symbolic legitimacy, of course, is not independent of the
practical efficacy discussed in the previous section. Perceived legitimacy
stems in part from very utilitarian concerns. If a legal system in general is
perceived to preserve safety, protect property, and contribute to prosperity,
it gains the allegiance of the community it serves.3 69 Even where individuals
believe the exercise of the law to be ineffective or arbitrary in isolated
cases, the reservoir of belief in the overall utility of the legal system helps to
ensure compliance and respect. Where, however, a legal system cannot
address concerns of significant impact to the community, it loses both its
purpose and its legitimacy. 30 To the extent that tribal legal officials cannot
address the everyday questions of law and order-to take examples from
recent cases, zoning, reckless driving on reservation roads, regulation of on-
reservation businesses, or searches of private property by law
enforcement-they lose this source of legitimacy.
Power over non-Indians is also crucial for reasons distinct to tribal legal
systems. Western-style governmental institutions came to most reservations
as a means of controlling Indian people. Policy makers saw acceptance of
Anglo law as both necessary and instrumental to acceptance of Anglo
civilization.371 In the 1860s, federal agents on Indian reservations began to
experiment with using Indian people as tools for imposition of legal order
on reservations.37 In 1883, the Indian Department established regulations
for formal Courts of Indian Offenses, in which Indian judges were
appointed by federal agents to enforce prohibitions against polygamy, use
Homey & Cassia Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instrumental Change in Six Urban
Jurisdictions, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 117, 118-22 (199 1).
368. See, e.g., Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where Does Economic Development
Really Come From? Constitutional Rule Among the Contemporary Sioux and Apache, 33 ECON.
INQUIRY 402, 423-24 (1995). While I believe that Kalt and Cornell wrongly attribute the
governmental instability and resulting economic failure of the Oglala Sioux Tribe to the failure
of its governmental structure to mimic the traditional tribal structure of the nineteenth century, I
believe they are correct in pointing to its problems as an effect of a community that does not
respect its government or its representatives.
369. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 151, at 143 ("Law is right because it is useful.").
370. See Merry, supra note 151, at 56 (noting that inability of courts to resolve disputes in
urban housing project actually increased violence in community).
371. See generally HAGAN, supra note 312.
372. These tribal members were more effective in enforcing the will of the colonizers than
the government itself could ever be. Id. at 26-27, 31, 35-37. As the Agent of San Carlos
Apache boasted, "our little squad of Indian Police have done more effective scouting... than
General Kautz has done with all his troops and four companies of Indian scouts." Id. at 37.
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of medicine men, and policies of mandatory schooling and agricultural
labor.373
The above themes are repeated in Navajo legal history. The Navajos'
first experience with a western legal system came at the time of their most
severe domination by the United States. In 1864, after centuries of
successful resistance to Spanish, Mexican, and American forces,37 4 Navajo
leaders finally accepted defeat at the hands of Kit Carson and his troops.
Under siege and threat of starvation if they did not leave their canyon
strongholds, about half of the Navajo population took the "Long Walk"3 75 to
Fort Sumner in Bosque Redondo, New Mexico. Once there, heartsick at
their separation from Dinetah, the Navajo homelands, and dependent on the
federal superintendent for inadequate rations,376 Navajos became subjects in
a failed experiment at forced colonization. In this atmosphere of despair the
federal government began its first experiments to "introduce" the Navajo
people to the rule of law. The people were divided into twelve villages, each
with a principal chief charged "to carry out and enforce all laws given him
for the government of his village, or any instructions he may receive at any
time from the commanding officer. 37 7 Together with his subchiefs, each
chief presided over a trial level court for arbitration of disputes and
373. See H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 48-1, pt. 5, at 3-376 (1883) (1883 Report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs).
374. Although Spain had first begun to colonize the Southwest in the 1500s, RAYMOND
FRIDAY LOCKE, THE BOOK OF THE NAVAJO 153-54 (5th ed. 1992), and the Mexicans in their
stead had waged a campaign of raiding and slavery against the Navajo for many decades, id. at
181-96, when the United States claimed the territory after the Mexican War of 1846, the
Navajos still lived independently, and few had entered the depths of their country. Id. at 202-07.
375. Like the better known "Trail of Tears" walked by the Five Civilized Tribes across the
Mississippi, many died on this four-hundred-mile trip. In the words of one historian:
[b]y the second day of the march coyotes began to follow the long line of
Navajos, marching a few abreast in family groups, and hawks and crows
circled overhead, waiting to make a meal of the next body. The horses
weakened and stumbled, and as soon as they fell they were slaughtered and
the meat divided among the hungry Dineh. Without the horses, many of the
aged, too weak to keep up, were left behind. Their relatives gave them a little
food and marched on with tears in their eyes.
Id. at 363. More than one in ten that began the journey died before its completion. Id. at 362-63.
376. Futilely counting on harvests that never materialized, see S. EXEC. Doc. No. 38-36, at
3 (1864) (expectation that reservation would soon become self-sustaining), and too busy with
the Civil War and its aftermath to devote enough resources to feed the many Navajos, Congress
never appropriated funds for even half of the rations the Navajo needed. LOCKE, supra note 374,
at 365-67. The rations that were provided were sometimes composed of rancid bacon and
weevily flour, supplies that had been declared unfit for the federal soldiers to eat. Id. at 372.
377. Proceedings of a Board of Officers at Fort Sumner, New Mexico (Apr. 26, 1865),
reprinted in ROESSEL, supra note 328, at 22 [hereinafter Proceedings]; see also James W. Zion,
Civil Rights in Navajo Common Law, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 523, 533 (2002).
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adjudication of criminal offenses.378 The offenses the military officers
designed were more appropriate to a labor camp than a court of law, and
included imprisonment, lashes, or hard labor for such "crimes" as refusing
to work, destroying agricultural tools provided by the government,
destroying farm produce, absence from the reservation, and absence from
one's assigned village between 7 p.m. and 5 a.m. in winter, or 8 p.m. to 4
a.m. in summer.379
After four years of imprisonment, the United States finally permitted the
Navajos to return to the Dinehtah.38° Soon after their return, the federal
agent set up a Navajo police force to control Navajos that were leaving the
reservation to raid Mexican livestock. 38 1 A Navajo Court of Indian Offenses
was created in 1892382 after a federal report that "if conducted it would
serve to teach the tribe the white man's manner of dealing out justice and
give them an idea of law and legal procedure. 383
The Navajo court and police quickly became associated with alien
federal practices.384 Shortly before the court was created, Black Horse, the
leader of the Rough Rock portion of the Reservation, led a federal siege
against the agent and his Navajo police when they came to forcibly collect
Navajo children to send to boarding school.385 The Navajo police and courts
also enforced the infamous federal stock reduction programs of the 1930s.386
By taking away Navajo livestock, these federal attempts to reduce
overgrazing on the Navajo Nation .tore at the deep structure of Navajo
economic and cultural life.387
As on other reservations, however, the Navajo courts also performed
much needed law and order functions. Because of the failure of federal
officials to adequately prosecute crimes under the Major Crimes Act, a
378. Proceedings, supra note 377, at 23.
379. Id. at 24.
380. LOCKE, supra note 374, at 383-84.
381. Id. at 397.
382. Tom Tso, Moral Principles, Traditions, and Fairness in the Navajo Nation Code of
Judicial Conduct, 76 JUDICATURE 15, 16 (1992) [hereinafter Tso, Moral Principles].
383. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, REPORT ON INDIANS TAXED AND
INDIANS NOT TAXED IN THE UNITED STATES (EXCEPT ALASKA) AT THE ELEVENTH CENSUS 1890,
at 159 (1894).
384. Stephen Conn, Mid-Passage-The Navajo Tribe and Its First Legal Revolution, 6 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1978).
385. HAGAN, supra note 312, at 77.
386. Conn, supra note 384, at 333.
387. PARMAN, supra note 331, at 65-66. Antagonism to this program, and the association
of it with John Collier, was the main reason the Navajo people rejected the Indian
Reorganization Act and thereby forewent almost one million dollars in federal assistance. Id. at
77.
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majority of criminal cases were prosecuted in the Navajo courts.3 88 In
addition, social change had created both problems and segments of the
population not amenable to the social control provided by the clan
system.3 89 Young men returning from military service overseas brought with
them problems not easily dealt with by traditional ceremonies,3 90 and a
disdain for the informality of the Navajo courts and the lack of formal
education of their judges.39' Local communities asked that their members be
deputized to control increasing crime.3 92 The Navajo Tribal Council
therefore lobbied Congress for funds, and when this failed, dedicated scarce
tribal resources to expanding their legal system in response to the demands
of the Navajo community. 393
The Navajo Nation also saw a need to develop courts to reassure
outsiders and fend off efforts to extend state jurisdiction over its
reservation.394 In 1959, these efforts brought the tribe a tremendous legal
victory. In Williams v. Lee,395 the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Arizona Supreme Court to hold that the state court had no jurisdiction over
an action by a non-Indian trader to collect a debt against Navajos for goods
sold on the Navajo Nation. Relying in part on the fact that "[t]he Tribe itself
ha[d] in recent years greatly improved its legal system,'3 96 the Court held
that there could "be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction
here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves. '397
Despite this triumphant cap on judicial reform, the Navajo Nation, like
other tribes, must struggle with the legacy of colonialism in trying to
achieve internal legitimacy. On the one hand, their governments and courts
may be perceived as tools of the colonizers, implementing a law that is
almost by definition illegitimate. On the other hand, seen through eyes
colored by years of non-Indian education, they may be perceived as
illegitimate because they lack the formality, the resources, or the training of
388. Conn, supra note 384, at 334 n.27.
389. Id. at 339.
390. Id. For an extraordinary literary depiction of the problems of returning Laguna Pueblo
veterans, see LESLIE MARMON SILKO, CEREMONY (1977).
391. Conn, supra note 384, at 342.
392. Id. at 339.
393. Id. at 340.
394. S. 1407, 81st Cong. § 9 (1949) (including extension of state jurisdiction in Navajo-
Hopi Rehabilitation Act). See also Conn, supra note 384, at 343-46.
395. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
396. Id. at 222.
397. Id. at 223.
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non-Indian courts. 398 Frank Pommersheim eloquently lays out this dilemma
in his book Braid of Feathers:
Identifiable segments of most tribes have at times refused to
consider tribal courts legitimate. In this regard, many tribal courts
are vilified as "white men's" creations .... The courts are seen as
instruments of outside forces and values that are not traditional
and therefore not legitimate.
By contrast, some segments of most tribal populations (and
local non-Indian populations) view tribal courts as illegitimate
because they fall, or appear to fall, far below recognized state and
federal standards in such matters ranging from the institutional
separation of powers to the provision of civil due process and
enforcement of judgments.399
Loss of jurisdiction over non-Indians undermines tribal courts in the eyes
of both of these segments of reservation society. Indian people, with a foot
each in reservation and non-reservation worlds, are not deaf to the message
sent by limiting tribal adjudication to them: Indian courts are inferior, good
enough for Indians but not for white folks. This message contributes to
mistrust and alienation from tribal courts and institutions. As John St. Clair,
the Chief Judge of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribal Court of the Wind
River Indian Reservation, testified to the Senate Indian Affairs Committee,
"[t]his double standard of justice creates resentment and projects the image
that non-Indians are above the law in the area where they choose to live or
choose to enter into."4 ° When the federal government declares that the
courts of subordinate tribal governments cannot have jurisdiction over
members of the dominant society, it cannot help but undermine the
legitimacy of the courts in the eyes of the communities they serve.
398. Two studies of the Navajo courts from the 1970s reveal internal legitimacy problems
attributable to these factors. Samuel Brakel examined the Navajo courts in his 1978 book
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE. BRAKEL, supra note 8.
One of the essential problems that Brakel found with the Navajo courts as with the two other
tribal court systems he studied was that a sense of inferiority led the relatively uneducated tribal
judges to rely heavily on legal technicalities and on the urging of legally educated counsel. Id. at
84-90. This judicial insecurity, he found, deprived the courts both of the ability to administer
justice, to hear both sides fairly, or to express any kind of local or customary sense of justice. Id.
at 95-96. While Brakel argued for the abolishment of tribal courts, Dan Vicenti and his
coauthors on the 1972 THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE: DINt BIBEE HAz'AANII, argued for their
preservation and greater independence from non-tribal law. VICENTI, supra note 181. But like
Brakel, the authors found that Navajo judges, in their efforts to appear just as good as non-
Indian courts, relied too heavily on non-Indian attorneys and practiced a kind of rigid formality
that had little to do with justice. Id.
399. POMMERSHEIM, supra note 11, at 67-68.
400. Hearing, supra note 4, at 29 (testimony of John St. Clair).
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B. Jurisdiction over Outsiders and Institutional Fairness
The previous section focused on the importance of jurisdiction over
outsiders in ensuring that tribal legal systems are effective. This section will
focus on the importance of jurisdiction over outsiders in ensuring that they
are just. If tribal courts did not have power to adjudicate outsider rights, I
will argue, they would not be so fair. Despite the recent inroads into tribal
jurisdiction over outsiders, in many cases tribal courts will be the only fora
in which they can assert their claims. Fairness of tribal court systems,
therefore, is of significant concern both for tribal members and
nonmembers.
1. Jurisdiction over Outsiders and Conceptions of the Judicial Role
Somewhat counterintuitively, it appears that the best explanation for the
evenhandedness of the Navajo courts is the sense of self-importance held by
its decision-makers. Political scientists have long examined judicial "role
orientations," or judicial understandings of the institutional role of courts
and judges,4"' as one factor influencing judicial behavior.4"2 Particular
conceptions of the judicial role may lead judges to depart in judicial
behavior from individual preferences, whether it is to cater to the needs of a
particular group, 403 to attempt to strictly follow prior judicial precedent, 4° or
401. James L. Gibson, Personality and Elite Political Behavior: The Influence of Self
Esteem on Judicial Decision Making, 43 J. POL. 104, 108 (1981).
402. See John M. Scheb, II et al., Judicial Role Orientations, Attitudes and Decision
Making: A Research Note, 42 W. POL. Q. 427, 427-28 (1989) (collecting citations to work on
judicial role orientations).
403. Such an orientation could be clearly wrong, as when a judge sees herself as serving the
interests of her particular race or class, or more acceptably, as when a judge sees the judicial
role as protecting the powerless from oppression by the majority.
404. Much work has been devoted to trying to determine the existence and importance of
such "activist" or "restraintist" attitudes toward the appropriate judicial role. See, e.g., Victor
Eugene Flango et al., The Concept of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note, 19 AM. J. POL. SCi.
277, 279, 281 (1975); J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Role Perceptions and Behavior in Three U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 39 J. POL. 916, 922 (1977); Scheb, supra note 402, at 427. This work is not
of great significance to the inquiry as to tribal judicial treatment of nonmembers. The supposed
restraintist-activist divide conceals the general judicial agreement that restraint and creativity
both have appropriate roles in decision-making, and the narrow range of cases (about 10% of
cases according to one survey of appellate judges) judges consider offer some scope for
creativity. Howard, supra, at 922. There is general agreement, in other words, that both
creativity and interpretation are appropriate judicial behaviors, and the differences are ones of
time and place. Id. Rather, the concern about tribal courts is that they will be swayed by factors
that are generally agreed to be judicially inappropriate, in particular the status of the parties and
political pressure by tribal communities. It is the importance of judicial role orientations in
resisting these pressures that is more important.
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to defer to other governmental institutions.405 Navajo justices' conception of
the court's institutional role appears to be a significant factor behind the
court's relatively good track record. This conception, in turn, is importantly
connected to the scope of their jurisdiction.
As an institution, the Navajo court thinks a lot of itself. Its decisions are
replete with references to the important role of the court in providing a just
and distinctly tribal resolution to disputes that come before it, and its judges
traverse the country and even the world arguing for the preservation of the
courts and for the dissemination of the legal values promulgated by it.4"6
This sense of self-importance is also evident in the one exception to the
general evenhandedness of the Navajo Supreme Court. Where a litigant
challenges the inherent jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation, the litigant is
probably going to lose.4°7 In many cases, the Navajo courts will cede
jurisdiction to another forum, whether in a child custody case because the
child was wrongly taken from another jurisdiction,4 8 an employment case
against a state school district in which the court deferred to the state courts
as a matter of comity,4°9 or a tort case where the litigant had already chosen
state worker's compensation remedies. 4'0 But in each case raising the
question whether the Navajo Nation courts as a matter of inherent
jurisdiction had the power to regulate a particular dispute, the courts held
that it did, even in cases in which federal courts might reach a different
conclusion.4 1
405. See Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme
Court Desicionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1437, 1479-80 (2001).
406. One can see this by reviewing a few of the many articles and speeches by Robert
Yazzie and Tom Tso, who together were Chief Justices of the Navajo Nation courts during
almost the entire period I examine. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 26-28, 86-103 (testimony of
Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation); Tom Tso, Indian Nations and the Human
Right to an Independent Judiciary, 3. N.Y. CITY L. REV. 105 (1998); Tso, Moral Principles,
supra note 382; Tso, The Process of Decision Making, supra note 134; Yazzie, Life Comes
From It, supra note 326; Robert Yazzie, "Watch Your Six": An Indian Nation Judge's View of
25 Years of Indian Law, Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 497
(1999) [Yazzie, Watch Your Six].
407. This does not mean, however, that the court will be biased against the litigant as to the
substantive issues. As discussed above, in a 1999 employment case involving an employer that
had repeatedly challenged the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation in a variety of contexts, the
court held that the Nation did have jurisdiction to regulate the company's employment practices,
but reversed the lower court's holding that those practices violated Navajo law. Manygoats v.
Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98, 2000 NANN 0000003, 59 (Navajo Jan. 14, 2000)
(VersusLaw).
408. See discussion, supra Part III.C.3.
409. Hubbard v. Chinle School Dist. 3 Navajo Rptr. 167, 171 (1982).
410. See discussion, supra Part III.C.l.
411. See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Navajo court improperly found tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian employer). Of course, as the
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This insistence on tribal inherent jurisdiction provides support for the
importance of Navajo justices' role orientations in another way, by
discounting the importance of strategic motivations in their decision-
making. The strategic model for explaining judicial behavior suggests that
while judges act primarily to forward their individual preferences, they do
so strategically, aware that their behavior is constrained by the power of
other institutional actors.41 2 The Navajo justices, it might be argued, rule in
favor of non-Indians only to avoid federal judicial and legislative
restrictions on their jurisdiction. But questions of jurisdiction over outsiders
are among the few tribal court decisions that can always be challenged in
federal court.413 While the justices are keenly aware of their vulnerability to
federal control,44 they frequently rule against non-Indians in the one area in
which the federal courts may exercise significant control and even respond
by restricting their jurisdiction. This suggests that where role orientations
and strategic goals conflict, ideas of the institutional importance of the
Navajo courts rather than the desire to avoid federal reversal of their actions
hold sway.
Rather than create incentives to despotism, this sense of self-importance
has only enhanced the institutional imperatives to ensure that all litigants
can be heard and that decisions are not unduly influenced by factors
perceived as inconsistent with the judicial role, such as political pressures or
the membership status of the parties. Other studies regarding judicial
behavior have noted the importance of both individual self-esteem and
internalized role expectations in leading judges to avoid external pressures
and personal biases when deciding cases.4" 5 In the Navajo case as well, the
U.S. Supreme Court has increasingly departed from precedent to limit tribal jurisdiction, Navajo
Nation decisions may be seen as a more faithful reflection of precedent, and have been upheld
by reviewing lower federal courts only to find the decision reversed by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 210 F.3d 1247, 1261-64 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding, as had
the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, that the Navajo Nation had jurisdiction to tax Atkinson),
rev'd, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
412. See Cross & Nelson, supra note 405, at 1445-46.
413. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852-53 (1985)
(establishing federal jurisdiction to hear challenges to tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers).
414. It is difficult being a judge when you have to watch your rear to make
certain that those folks do not push you into something that can be the basis
for review of one of your decisions by a federal court, or meat for testimony
in Congress about how bad your court may be.
Yazzie, Watch Your Six, supra note 406, at 500.
415. See Gibson, supra note 401, at 123-24 (finding that judges high in self-esteem were
more likely to resist external pressures and judge in conformance with the law than those with
low self-esteem); LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 65-67 (2000)
(discussing ways judicial desire for legal accuracy and concern for doctrine constrain judicial
bias).
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justices' sense of self-importance is a large part of the reason that the court
carefully scrutinizes the facts and law before it and tries to rule justly in
response. It is the reason that the court not only often rules in favor of non-
Navajo parties, but also a substantial portion of the time rules against the
Navajo Nation itself. It has led the court, with no constitutional separation
of powers, to construe Navajo common law and the ICRA to create a right
of judicial review of governmental actions.416 It has also led it to threaten to
create judicial waivers of tribal sovereign immunity until the Navajo Nation
Council created a legislative waiver.417
The deliberate effort to incorporate Navajo customary law has only
enhanced this concern for justice. In creating a jurisprudence of Navajo
common law, the court sees itself as expressing the ideals not of aliens or
colonizers, but of the Navajo people. Each articulation of a Navajo common
law concept, therefore, is a public declaration not only to Navajo people but
to the wider community, "This is the best of who we are." Justice Robert
Yazzie once commented that the reaction to one of his speeches was
"Yazzie is bashing Anglo justice systems again."4 8 But this kind of
"bashing" suggests that tribal judges will use the freedom to diverge from
Anglo legal standards as an opportunity not to lower but to raise the bar in
protecting those that appear before them. While tribal judges likely
exaggerate the differences and superiority of tribal over state and federal
legal systems, an empirical study of tribal court decisions regarding
fundamental rights suggests that the results of tribal court adjudication are
at least as fair as those that would be expected in non-tribal courts.4 19
Eliminating the power to adjudicate rights of outsiders, and to do so with
a relative degree of independence from outsider legal standards, would
greatly diminish this sense of self-importance. The jurisdiction of tribal
courts would then be radically less than state and federal courts, and the
disputes before them would not include many of those in which, I have
argued, law does its real work. The impetus to act in accordance with the
416. Halona v. MacDonald, I Navajo Rptr. 189, 203-06 (1978).
417. Keeswood v. Navajo Tribe, 2 Navajo Rptr. 46, 51-55 (1979) (urging tribe to waive
sovereign immunity); Johnson v. Navajo Nation, 5 Navajo Rptr. 192, 195-96 (1987) (holding
immunity waived under Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act passed "perhaps at the 'urging' of the
Court").
418. Yazzie, Life Comes From It, supra note 326, at 190.
419. Rosen, supra note 8, at 578-81. Rosen found that tribal courts have "interpreted the
ICRA in good faith ..... take federal case law seriously[,] and tend to deviate from federal
doctrines only for good reasons," and that among the 194 cases he reviewed, "[t]here are no
outcomes that flatly violate [the right of] Protection, and only one case's reasoning is clearly
problematic." Id. at 579.
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role of the judge, independent from immediate pressures and prejudices,
would be greatly reduced.
2. Jurisdiction over Outsiders and Grappling with Difference
Jurisdiction over outsiders may also enhance the justice of the courts and
the broader Navajo community in another way, by forcing judges to
consider and resolve real conflicts in Navajo society. Despite the claims of
some advocates of tribal courts that tribal traditional dispute resolution is
always just, both traditional tribal norms and modem tribal laws, like those
of any legal system, may reinforce unequal power structures.4 20 The law's
distinction between members and nonmembers conceals many of the real
sources of disadvantage within tribal legal systems. Tribal communities are
not homogenous-they are composed of men and women, of traditionally
powerful families and traditionally powerless ones, of those with Anglo
education and those with traditional education.421 Tribal politics and laws,
whether they reflect pre-contact traditions or modem developments, may
favor one group over another. Separated from the demands of the broader
community in which tribes are situated, uncritical valorization of tradition
may prevent tribal communities from examining this inequality. By
continually facing litigants and contexts involving a wide variety of
perspectives, however, judges are forced to reexamine how traditional
norms and their modem iterations accord with the ideals and reality of the
community.
Anthropologist Bruce Miller notes this effect in his study of courts run
by three different tribes composed of the indigenous Coast Salish people of
the Northwestern United States.422 Miller found that the courts functioned
best when they had jurisdiction over subjects creating real conflict among
tribal members. 423 The Upper Skagit tribal court system, which was created
to regulate and adjudicate individual disputes regarding the fishing rights
won by the tribe in 1974, functioned much better than the South Island
Justice Project or the Stolo Justice Project, both of which were created to
provide a forum for supposedly harmonious and consensus based law,
rather than to serve a meaningful distributive or punitive function.424 Miller
420. See also MILLER, supra note 8, at 11.
421. Indeed, Stephen Conn has pointed out that the need to address differences along these
lines emerging within Navajo society after World War II was a significant motivation to the
tribe in enhancing its formal legal system. Conn, supra note 384, at 339.
422. MILLER, supra note 8.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 7-9.
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concludes that "these three cases suggest that it is a dialectical process, an
interchange between abstractions of past practice and specifics of current
disputes, rather than simply the contemplation of past practices, that enable
tribal justice institutions to become effective and acceptable to community
members. 4 25
At the same time, the demands of outsiders may provide judges with
greater freedom to institute legal change than they might otherwise possess.
A potential criticism of tribal legal systems is that the small size of tribal
communities and the importance of clan relationships among community
members present an obstacle to objective resolution of legal disputes. This
obstacle may not be significantly greater than it is in small towns, in which
judges, lawyers, and parties typically know each other well.426 But the
presence of individuals not tied to the Navajo Nation by bonds of kinship
and familiarity may enable judges to revitalize legal rules to better respond
to the disputes before them.
One can see the value of the confrontation with difference in the
decisions of the Navajo appellate court. In several cases, judicial review of
cases involving outsiders has led to changes that tend to equalize Navajo
statutory law. For example, one of the statutes passed as part of the Navajo
law "reform" of the 1950s provided that while Navajo couples could legally
marry in a traditional Navajo ceremony, Navajos could only marry non-
Navajos in accordance with procedures conforming to state law. In two
cases, Navajos came before the court seeking validation of their customary
marriages to their deceased non-Navajo spouses.42 7 In both cases, the court
refused to grant the petitions, citing the clear language of the statute. In each
case, however, the court expressed its concern with the law. In 1985, in In
re Marriage of Garcia,428 while refusing to validate the marriage between a
Navajo and a Mexican-American, the court declared that it was:
impressed by the arguments of counsel for the petitioner which
recounted a history of non-Navajos adopting a Navajo way of life
and becoming a part of their community.... The Court recognizes
the contribution and importance of many non-Navajos but finds
425. Id. at 12.
426. A young lawyer I worked with on the Navajo Nation, for example, was indignant after
the attorney on the other side of a domestic relations case she had filed in Farmington, New
Mexico, informed her that he had spoken with the judge and they had decided how to handle the
case.
427. In re Marriage of Francisco, 6 Navajo Rptr. 134, 134-35 (1989); In re Marriage of
Garcia, 5 Navajo Rptr. 30, 30-31 (1985).
428. 5 Navajo Rptr. 30.
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that the provisions of the Navajo Tribal Code require it to affirm
the decision of the trial court.429
In 1989, in In re Marriage of Francisco, 43 the court called for change of
the rule:
[S]aying that "marriages between Navajos and non-Navajos may
be validly contracted only by the parties' complying with
applicable state or foreign law," allows outside law to govern
domestic relations within Navajo jurisdiction. Such needless
relinquishment of sovereignty hurts the Navajo Nation. The
Navajo people have always governed their marriage practices,
whether the marriage is mixed or not, and must continue to do so
to preserve sovereignty....
[The law] enacted in 1957 has outlived its usefulness.43 1
The Navajo Nation Council subsequently changed the law.
In 1999, in Means v. Dist. Court of the Chinle Judicial Dist. ,432 the court
considered a challenge to its criminal jurisdiction over a non-Navajo
Indian.433 The Navajo Nation sought to prosecute Lakota activist Russell
Means for the battery of his father-in-law, Leon Grant, a member of the
Omaha tribe, and his brother-in-law, Jeremiah Bitsui, a member of the
Navajo Nation. 34 Means alleged that because the tribe could not prosecute a
similarly situated non-Indian, jurisdiction over him was founded in race and
violated the equal protection provisions of the ICRA, the Navajo Nation
Bill of Rights, and the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.435 The court rejected the challenge.436 While it could have
relied on the federal Duro Fix to justify its jurisdiction, it chose not to, and
relied instead on the legal relationship with outsiders created by the Navajo
Treaty of 1868 and by Navajo common law.43 '
First, the court found that the treaty language, interpreted as the Navajo
negotiators would have understood it, granted the tribe jurisdiction over
429. Id. at 30-31.
430. 6 Navajo Rptr. 134.
431. Id. at 140 (citations omitted).
432. 7 Navajo Rptr. 382 (1999).
433. Id at 383. For a longer discussion of the significance of this case, see Paul Spruhan,
Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District and the Hadane Doctrine in Navajo
Criminal Law, I TRIBAL L.J. 3 (2000), available at http://tlj.unm.edu/articles/volume-1/spruhan
/text.php.
434. 7 Navajo Rptr. at 384-85, 387-88.
435. Id. at 383-84.
436. Id. at 393-95.
437. Id. at 389-91.
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nonmember Indians.438 It pointed to the concern of Navajo treaty negotiators
and the reassurance of the treaty commissioners that the tribe would be able
to accept nonmembers onto their lands and that those outsiders would be
subject to tribal jurisdiction. 39 Second, the court pointed to the Navajo
common law concept of membership by voluntary affiliation:
While there is a formal process to obtain membership as a Navajo,
•.. that is not the only kind of "membership" under Navajo Nation
law. An individual who marries or has an intimate relationship
with a Navajo is a hadane (in-law). The Navajo People have
adoone'e or clans, and many of them are based upon the
intermarriage of original Navajo clan members with people of
other nations .... A hadane or in-law assumes a clan relation to a
Navajo when an intimate relationship forms, and when that
relationship is conducted within the Navajo Nation, there are
reciprocal obligations to and from family and clan members under
Navajo common law....
We find that the petitioner, by reason of his marriage to a
Navajo, longtime residence within the Navajo Nation, his
activities here, and his status as a hadane, consented to Navajo
Nation criminal jurisdiction. This is not done by "adoption" in any
formal or customary sense, but by assuming tribal relations and
establishing familial and community relationships under Navajo
common law.440
While a loss for the non-Navajo litigant, by overcoming the largely
federally-created distinction between enrolled members and non-enrolled
residents, the decision created a tribally legitimate basis for incorporating
nonmembers into the Navajo community."
More recently, in Staff Relief Inc. v. Polacca,"2 the court judicially
amended a Navajo statute to provide remedies to a non-Navajo." 3 There, a
non-Indian headhunter had offered a member of the Hopi Tribe a job with
the Indian Health Service but then denied him the job after he had accepted
and moved to the area. Mr. Polacca sued the headhunter under the Navajo
438. Id. at 390-91. This rule of treaty interpretation is one of the fundamental Indian law
canons of construction. 1941 COHEN, supra note 30, at 37-38.
439. Means, 7 Navajo Rptr. at 390-91.
440. Id. at 392-93 (footnote and citations omitted).
441. The Ninth Circuit has recently upheld the decision against equal protection and due
process challenges, although it did so on federal Indian law principles rather than the Navajo
principles the Navajo Nation Supreme Court emphasized. Means v. Navajo Nation, 420 F.3d
1037, 1044-47 (9th Cir. 2005).
442. No. SC-CV-86-98, 2000 NANN 0000006, (Navajo Aug. 18, 2000) (VersusLaw).
443. No. SC-CV-86-98, 2000 NANN 0000006, at 1123-24, 27-30.
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Preference in Employment Act ("NPEA"), and the headhunter argued that
Polacca had no standing to sue because the Act limited the right to file a
complaint to Navajos. The Navajo Supreme Court declared this limitation
was enacted "[flor reasons beyond the knowledge of this court" and
"rectif[ied] that shortcoming by ruling that under basic principles of equal
protection of law, any person who is injured by a violation of NPEA may
file a claim with the Commission." 4  The court relied both on federal
constitutional jurisprudence declaring that a court might broaden coverage
of a statute otherwise constitutionally defective, and on the Navajo Treaty
of 1868 that recognized the power of the Navajo Nation "to admit non-
Navajos to its territorial jurisdiction, and thus its protection, or to deny
entry. Once an individual obtains the right to enter the Navajo Nation, due
process of law requires that the Navajo Nation extend the protection of its
law to all individuals."" 5 This decision may not have arisen purely from the
court's sense of justice. In hearing the case, the Navajo Nation was surely
aware of contemporary challenges to tribal jurisdiction and tribal protection
of rights. 446 But the decision was chosen by the court and thus became an
expression of sovereignty and Navajo values rather than a resented intrusion
of outside law.
In each of these decisions, we see that allowing judicial determination of
cases involving outsiders enhances the fairness of the law. By considering
broad-based statutes as applied to the individual circumstances of
nonmembers on the Navajo Nation, the court is moved to criticize and
amend aspects of the laws that do not treat them fairly. By struggling to
understand the position of outsiders in the Navajo community, the court
recovers traditions in which members and nonmembers were not separated
by artificial legal rules. Far from permitting arbitrary control to the
disadvantage of outsiders, judicial jurisdiction appears to reveal and correct
some of the arbitrariness of the position of outsiders in the Navajo
community.
444. Id. at n 21-22.
445. Id. at 22.
446. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000) (invalidating qualifications
based on Native Hawaiian ancestry for voting on trustees for land held in trust for Native
Hawaiians); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking down
protections for Alaska Natives in Reindeer Act of 1937 as race-based); Dawavendewa v. Salt
River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1998)
(invalidating application of Navajo preference in lease agreement to Hopi Indians as
discrimination based on national origin). On remand, Dawavendewa was dismissed for failure
to join the Navajo Nation, an indispensable party. Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric.
Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002).
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V. CONCLUSION
In the American imagination, Indian tribes function as the bearers of
history for a country uneasy about its lack of history, a symbol of tradition
and culture for a country struggling with its aggressive modernity. Supreme
Court jurisprudence has reflected and contributed to this image,
emphasizing the foreignness of tribal courts, and denying tribes the ability
to shape their negotiations with the outside world.
Examination of the role of nonmembers in tribal courts suggests a need
to reconceptualize both tribes and what jurisdiction over those labeled
outsiders means for them. Just as the Navajo people are importantly
intertwined with non-Navajo society, the genius of Indian tribes lies not in
being living museums, but rather, in adapting in the face of change to
survive without losing their culture or disintegrating as communities.
Sovereignty must be understood in this light: not as the right to stand still in
a mythicized past, but as the power to change so as to maintain and
strengthen one's community when many of the historic bonds between that
community have disappeared. The challenge of federal Indian law, then, is
to create an arena in which tribes can combine their past, present, and future
to create norms and institutions that can sustain tribal communities.
Jurisdiction over those considered outsiders to tribes is crucial in
allowing this process to occur. It is precisely cases in which both worlds are
brought together that tribal courts best perform their community-building
role, by translating traditions eroded by generations of colonization into
living rules meaningful to the modem Indian community-a process Nell
Newton calls "reversing the politics of erasure."" 7 In determining the rules
of interaction between tribal members and nonmembers, tribal courts use
the institutional forms of the colonizer to reinvigorate the voice of the
colonized and make it heard. Were tribal courts limited to adjudicating the
rights of their members, they would lose their important role in defining the
tribal community sovereignty and ensuring its preservation.
At the same time, jurisdiction over outsiders is crucial in preserving the
fairness of tribal courts, both for members and nonmembers. Justice is not
created by ensuring that decision-makers have power only over those that
are just like them. Rather, it lies in ensuring that judges have enough pride
in their judicial role to fairly adjudicate the cases before them, as well as the
opportunity to scrutinize laws and practices against a variety of
perspectives. In the tribal context, jurisdiction over outsiders, along with a
measure of independence in exercising it, preserves both this necessary
447, Nell Newton, (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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institutional self-importance and the impetus to examine tribal practices and
ensure they conform to tribal ideals.
Whether this jurisdiction will be preserved depends, in part, on whether
the Supreme Court maintains the assumptions that color its opinions of the
last quarter century. Because the Court has proceeded in a haphazard,
incremental fashion in depriving tribes of such jurisdiction, there remains
much that can be preserved in future cases. If the Justices continue to
perceive tribal courts as unfair, unfamiliar places, they will continue to bend
the law and ignore the facts to find that tribes have no jurisdiction over
tribal nonmembers. If they continue to perceive self-government as the
power to protect practices that are untouched by time and the outside world,
they will continue to read actions that touch on nonmembers as unrelated to
the self-government that the Court is bound to protect.
These questions are equally applicable to Congress. As the Court
continues to undermine congressional and executive efforts to support tribal
self-determination, tribal advocates will turn to Congress to correct this
judicial policy-making cloaked in the mantle of federal common law.
Congress, more aware of the contemporary realities of tribal life, has not
fallen into the same traps as the Supreme Court. But in considering whether
to statutorily protect tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Congress will need
evidence that this move is necessary and that it will not result in injustice to
those affected.
In the past, the Court has made decisions regarding jurisdiction over
nonmembers against a backdrop of untested beliefs. This Article is a
beginning step in testing those beliefs and raising questions as to their
accuracy. It suggests that the Court should be cautious in assuming a broad
policy-making role in removing jurisdiction. Further, it suggests that
preservation of such jurisdiction, whether by the Court or Congress, is a
necessary part of fulfilling the commitment to tribal self-government that is
embodied in federal law.
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